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The past decade of Supreme Court cases dealing with race and
reapportionment, from Shaw v. Reno in 1993 to Easley v. Cromartie in
2001, have created ambiguity and tension. The Court has con-
structed a seemingly simple test: race cannot constitute the "pre-
dominant factor" in drawing legislative districts. Yet the Court has
done little to inform lawyers and lower courts in what contexts race
legitimately may be considered in the reapportionment process. In
this Essay, Professor Ken Gormley tackles that jurisprudential conun-
drum from a unique perspective. Professor Gormley is the author of
Archibald Cox: Conscience of a Nation (Perseus Books 1997), a biogra-
phy of the Harvard professor turned Solicitor General, who argued
the pivotal cases of Baker v. Carr and Reynolds v. Sims in the Supreme
Court and helped draft the Voting Rights Act of 1965. Professor
Gormley himself served as Executive Director of the Pennsylvania
Legislative Reapportionment Commission in the early 1990's, con-
fronting race issues first-hand. Professor Gormley concludes that the
"predominant factor" test is on the right path, however, to establish a
clear guide for lawyers, litigants, and lower courts, the Court must
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address when and to what extent race may legitimately play a role in
reapportionment; because, he argues, it always does.
INTRODUCTION
Modem redistricting cases are routinely intertwined with madden-
ingly complex racial issues that increasingly dominate reapportion-
ment jurisprudence. Another Term of the Supreme Court arrives,
another rivulet of racial reapportionment cases spills onto the docket.
Yet it is worth recalling that the body of law dealing with reavpor-
tionment-symbolized by the landmark decisions of Baker v. Carr and
Reynolds v. Sims2-had quite a separate origin from the body of law
dealing with minority voting rights. Regrettably, neither legal com-
mentators nor the Supreme Court have adequately separated out, or
reconciled, these often conflicting strands of constitutional jurispru-
dence. The result has been a mish-mash of loosely connected deci-
sions, which have caused lawyers, litigants, and lower courts to strug-
gle when it comes to the basic question whether, and to what extent,
race may be considered in redistricting.
The Supreme Court sought to eliminate confusion in this area by
crafting a test, initially articulated in a 1995 case, Miller v. Johnson,
that prohibits the creation of a voting district where race is the "pre-
dominant factor" motivating the reapportionment body. Yet, the
Court still has not fully fleshed out that standard.4 Nor has it con-
fronted the reality that race is always a motivating force to some ex-
tent in modem legislative map-drawing. As a result, the "predomi-
nant factor" test has led to disingenuity and, at times, outright
deception. It has encouraged litigants, lawyers, and state officials to
swear that race was not a factor in redistricting (with their fingers
crossed behind their backs), for fear that the ambiguous test might
be turned against them.
In my role as Executive Director of the Pennsylvania Legislative
Reapportionment Commission ("Commission"), which commenced
in early 1991 and spanned several years, I had a front-row seat, ena-
bling me to observe the underbelly of state reapportionment politics.
The Commission defended itself against twenty-seven lawsuits, includ-
ing one major Voting Rights Act suit in Philadelphia, and won them
1 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
377 U.S. 533 (1964).
3 515 U.S. 900 (1995).
4 For the perspective of one commentator who has criticized the jurisprudence in this area,
asserting that it is "on the brink of legal incoherence and political chaos," see Richard H. Pildes,
Principled Limitations on Racial and Partisan Redistricting, 106 YALE L.J. 2505, 2505-06 (1997).
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all.5 Even with this legal success, the battle over race issues was a so-
bering one. A close-up view of the down-and-dirty exercise of redis-
tricting leaves me convinced, a decade later, that the Supreme
Court's "predominant factor" test, as it has evolved, is moving in the
right direction. Moreover, the Supreme Court's recent decision in
Easley v. Cromartie6 indicates that the Court is beginning to grasp the
intricacies of reapportionment politics. Easley is the first major case
in a decade in which the Court, on plenary review, has upheld a re-
districting plan in the face of a racial gerrymandering challenge.
Significantly, Easley involved a situation in which race was clearly a
factor in the machinations that led to the congressional redistricting
in North Carolina. Nonetheless, the Court upheld the plan, conclud-
ing that traditional party politics was the predominant factor driving
the reapportionment body's construction of a district that encom-
passed a large segment of African-American voters.
The result in Easley was a sensible one. However, unless the "pre-
dominant factor" test is more sharply defined to specify when racial
considerations are permissible-under the Fourteenth Amendment,
the Fifteenth Amendment, and the Voting Rights Act-and when
such considerations are prohibited, the law will continue to be used
primarily to bludgeon political opponents and cause partisan mis-
chief, rather than to move voting rights jurisprudence forward pro-
ductively. Moreover, until the test is clarified, every major redistrict-
ing fight will continue to be transformed into a case of mandatory
appellate jurisdiction in the United States Supreme Court.
State legislative bodies and lower courts must be able to take aju-
dicially-created standard and translate it into practical applications.
Unfortunately, the "predominant factor" test is ambiguous enough
that it has permitted a dangerous assumption to take root since its in-
ception; namely, that it is presumptively illegal and unconstitutional
for racial considerations to enter the redistricting process for the
.7benefit of minorities As will be seen in this Essay, there are numer-
ous instances in which the creation of districts with conscious consid-
eration of racial factors is a perfectly reasonable (and indeed inevita-
ble) occurrence. The challenge must be to sort out the permissible
5 See KEN GORMLE, THE PENNSYLVANIA LEGISLATIVE REAPPORTIONMENT OF 1991 54-67
(1994) [hereinafter GORMLEY, REAPPORTIONMENT].
6 532 U.S. 234 (2001). The case was originally captioned Hunt v. Cromartie, 530 U.S. 260
(2000) (noting probable jurisdiction), however, the name of the new Governor of North Caro-
lina, Michael F. Easley, was substituted for former Governor James B. Hunt, Jr., pursuant to Su-
preme Court Rule 35.3.
7 See inftanotes 178-81 and accompanying text. For an example of scholarship encouraging
that view, see Judge Edith H.Jones, Judge Thomas and the Voting Rights Act, 12 REGENTU. L. REV.
333 (1999-2000).
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from the impermissible so that the "predominant factor" test can
move to a new level of constitutional utility.
I will argue that the Supreme Court's first task must be to separate
the "one-person-one-vote" strand of reapportionment cases linked to
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment from the
distinct body of Voting Rights Act jurisprudence premised upon the
Fifteenth Amendment. There is some overlap, of necessity. The
guarantee of equal protection under the laws certainly has relevance
in redistricting cases involving vote dilution, where one group of citi-
zens is alleged to have benefited at the expense of another because of
race. The Fifteenth Amendment also remains relevant. Exercising its
enforcement powers under that Amendment, Congress has enacted
the Voting Rights Act, which creates a different standard than that
ordinarily applicable in Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence. The
latter generally requires proof of intentional discrimination; the for-
mer does not. Only by separating out these two distinct lines of case-
law, which have become hopelessly intermingled, can the "predomi-
nant factor" test begin to make sense in an area where two constitu-
tional provisions intersect.
Second, I will argue that a revised "predominant factor" test must
be anchored upon a frank acknowledgment that in American society,
mandating that political mapmakers cease and desist from consider-
ing race in any fashion in the redistricting process is unworkable, un-
realistic, and undesirable. This mandate is inconsistent with the Vot-
ing Rights Act and the Fifteenth Amendment and is tantamount to
encouraging silent discrimination against minorities.
The reapportionment process employs every tactic-fair, unfair,
pretty, and not pretty-as political competitors seek to gain advan-
tage over a host of different adversaries. It ultimately takes into ac-
count not only race but ethnicity, religion, political affiliation, gen-
der, age, employment profile, veteran status, predisposition to vote,
and an unwieldy collection of other characteristics that define those
interest groups at work within any given political subdivision. That,
after all, is the essence of politics. The moment race is banned as a
factor that can considered in accommodating certain minority groups
in a positive fashion, it will be used sub silentio to harm those
groups, frustrating the express purposes of the Fifteenth Amend-
ment and the Voting Rights Act. A fine line exists between prohibit-
ing the use of race to affirmatively favor minorities in an improper
fashion and mandating that states wear blinders to race in a manner
8 As one commentator has expressed, "color-blindness" often becomes "a mere code word
for African-American invisibility." Lisa A. Kelly, Race and Place: Geographic and Transcendent
Community in the Post-Shaw Era, 49 VAND. L. REV. 227, 307-08 (1996).
[Vol. 4:4
RACE-BASED REDISTRICTING
that facilitates a silent, surreptitious embrace of traditional discrimi-
natory practices.
In the trenches of reapportionment, the "race card" is frequently
played by lawyers and litigants on both sides. For years, particularly
after the Supreme Court's decision in Thornburg v. Gingles,9 plaintiffs
argued that the Voting Rights Act required "maximization" of major-
ity-minority districts, or at least strict proportionality, where signifi-
cant racial bloc voting could be proven. That position has since been
rejected definitively by the Court.'0 Yet certain members of the Court
and of the legal academy have now floated the opposite view, which is
equally non-productive-namely, that the conscious consideration of
race under any circumstances is anathema." As long as lawyers and
public officials in the reapportionment field struggle under that mis-
perception, the Court will have to dig through piles of discarded
maps and data each decade in an effort to answer the elusive ques-
tion: Was race a factor in the construction of this reapportionment
plan or that redistricting map? Of course, the answer is always "yes,"
but the more relevant question is "to what extent?" The Fifteenth
Amendment and the Voting Rights Act of 1965 serve as a modem tes-
tament to that harsh fact that race and politics are inextricably inter-
twined in American life.12 The current case-law adequately informs
reapportionment bodies what they cannot do in creating redistricting
plans. The Supreme Court must now tackle the positive obverse of
the negative "predominant factor" test and explain when and to what
extent race can legitimately be considered in redistricting.
In other words, legislators and redistricting bodies must have a
certain zone of discretion, within which they may safely consider race
as a factor in performing their reapportionment work, just as they
consider countless other factors. This is different than seeking to in-
struct reapportionment bodies what they must do to comply with the
law-that is the subject of another body of literature which addresses
the parameters of the Voting Rights Act'3 and the breadth of its man-
date. A quite separate question that must be addressed is: How does
one define the scope of the reapportionment body's discretion to
take race into account when drawing districts, if it wishes to do so?
Until the Court answers that central question, those who labor in
the fields of reapportionment will remain perplexed, frustrated, and
inclined to avoid the issue for fear of walking into a nest of hornets.
9 478 U.S. 30 (1986).
10 See infra notes 190-91 and accompanying text.
n See supra note 7.
12 For a discussion of the history of the Voting Rights Act and its evolution, see infra notes
113-39 and accompanying text. See also DAVID MIcHAEL HUDSON, ALONG RAcIAL LINES:
CONSEQUENCES OFTHE 1965 VOTING RIGHTSACr (1998).
is See generally HUDSON, supra note 12. See also infra note 129.
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I. CONFESSIONS FROM THE REAPPORTIONMENT TRENCHES:
How ONE STATE INTENTIONALLY CREATED MINoRITY DISTRICTS
My own experience working on the Pennsylvania reapportion-
ment in 1991 provides a typical illustration of how race can be, and
routinely is, considered in a conscious fashion as part of the redis-
tricting process. Race was a significant force in the Pennsylvania re-
districting process. Indeed, in the end, race was intentionally and
openly considered in drawing state House and Senate districts. I re-
main convinced, however, that there was nothing improper, uncon-
stitutional, or illegal about that process. In fact, the natural adher-
ence to traditional districting principles and the legitimate concern
for avoiding maps which (intentionally or unintentionally) might
produce racially discriminatory results in contravention of the Voting
Rights Act, combined to make the conscious consideration of race
unavoidable. A brief history will demonstrate how racial factors do,
and must, embed themselves in a balanced redistricting mosaic.
A. History
In 1986, before I commenced work for the Pennsylvania Legisla-
tive Reapportionment Commission, the United States Supreme Court
issued an opinion that dramatically altered the way reapportionmentbodies" " . 14
bodies viewed race issues. In Thornburg v. Gingles, the Supreme
Court upheld Congress's 1982 amendments to the Voting Rights Act,
which gave minority groups more sway in overturning redistricting
plans that unfairly boxed them out of the political process.
Prior to Gingles, the Supreme Court had issued a rigid opinion in
Mobile v. Bolden,16 departing from prior case-law and holding that
14 478 U.S. 30 (1986).
15 In Ginges, plaintiffs challenged the use of multimember state House and Senate districts
under a North Carolina redistricting plan. The map, pursuant to Section 5 of the Voting Rights
Act, had been precleared by the justice Department, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1973(c). The Su-
preme Court reviewed the legislative history of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act to determine
whether the new North Carolina plan satisfied the "results" test set forth in the recent amend-
ments to the Act. Justice Brennan, writing for the majority in Gingles, observed that the essence
of a Section 2 claim was that some "electoral law, practice, or structure interacts with social and
historical conditions to cause an inequality in the opportunities enjoyed by black and white vot-
ers to elect their preferred representatives." Ginges, 478 U.S. at 47. In light of the 1982
amendments, the question turned on whether "as a result of the challenged practice or struc-
ture plaintiffs do not have an equal opportunity to participate in the political processes and to
elect candidates of their choice." Id at 44. The Court concluded that all but one of the chal-
lenged multimember districts created by the North Carolina legislature violated Section 2 of the
Voting Rights Act.
16 446 U.S. 55 (1980).
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plaintiffs were required to prove discriminatory intent in order to es-
tablish a claim under the Voting Rights Act. The "intent" require-
ment amounted to a weighty burden on plaintiffs, making it virtually
impossible to prove a violation of the Act without producing the pro-
verbial smoking gun. In 1982, however, the legislative branch re-
jected this stringent reading of the Voting Rights Act. Congress spe-
cifically amended the Act to include a more plaintiff-friendly "results"
test,17 which had been applied intermittently by the Supreme Court
prior to Mobile.18 Congress did not need to look far to justify amend-
ing the statute in this fashion; the insidious effects of widespread dis-
crimination in voting rights were on display in its own chambers. In
the Congress that convened in 1981, for instance, there were only 17
black representatives out of 435. This was true despite the fact that
the American voting-age population was 10.5 percent black.19 As the
Senate Report accompanying the 1982 amendments indicated:
"[S]ince the adoption of the Voting Right Act, [some] jurisdictions
have substantially moved from direct, over[t] impediments to the
right to vote to more sophisticated devices that dilute minority voting
strength"20
The white Chairman of the Georgia House Reapportionment
Committee had declared at the time of the 1970's redistricting: "I
don't want to draw nigger districts."21 In modifying Section 2 of the
Act to focus on results rather than intent, Congress sought to put an
end to lingering, surreptitious racist practices. It endorsed the Su-
preme Court's pre-Mobile view, expressed in cases like White v. Reges-
ter,2 which acknowledged that determining whether subtle forms of
discrimination were at work required a results-oriented analysis that
"depends upon a searching practical evaluation of the 'past and pres-
ent reality."' ' As amended in 1982, the Voting Rights Act provided a
statutory cause of action for plaintiffs whenever they could prove that
a voting standard, practice, or procedure had "resulted" in discrimi-
nation based upon race. The Gingles Court set forth a three-part test
for determining whether legislative districts violated the newly-
amended Act and impaired the ability of minorities to elect candi-
17 S. REP. NO. 97-417, at 10 (1982) [hereinafter Senate Report], quoted in Johnson v. De
Grandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1018 (1994). See also Shaw v. Reno (Shaw1), 509 U.S. 630, 641 (1993).
18 Se, e.g., White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755 (1973).
19 STATISTICAL ABSIRAGT OF THE UNITED STATES 1982-83 490 tbl. 802 (103d ed. 1982), cited
in Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 1050 (SouterJ., dissenting).
M Senate Report, supra note 17, at 10, quoted inJohnson, 512 U.S. at 1018.
21 Busbee v. Smith, 549 F. Supp. 494,501 (D.D.C. 1982) (listing findings of fact).
22 412 U.S. 755 (1973). For evidence that Congress specifically intended to return to a "re-
sults test," as applied by the Court in Wite and by other lower federal courts prior to Mobile, see
Senate Report, supra note 17, at 28, cited in Gingles, 478 U.S. at 35.
Senate Report, supra note 17, at 30, quoted in Johnson, 512 U.S. at 1018 (citing White v. Re-
gester, 412 U.S. at 770).
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dates of choice. Plaintiffs were required to establish the following
three "preconditions" as a threshold to making out a claim under
Section 2:
1. The minority group was sufficiently large and geographically compact
to constitute a majority in a single-member district;
2. The minority group was politically cohesive; and
3. In the absence of special circumstances, "bloc voting" by the white ma-
jority usually defeated the minority group's candidate of choice.24
The Gingles Court also sought to give substance to the "totality of
the circumstances" test embodied in Section 2(b). It pointed to
seven "typical factors," derived from the 1982 Senate Report, that
should be considered by courts in determining whether a Section 2
claim had been established by minority plaintiffs25 Although Gingles
itself involved at-large elections, the test set forth in that case soon
became the accepted standard for other minority vote dilution
26cases.
The upshot of Gingles was that some lower courts, embracing a po-
sition advanced by the NAACP and other minority groups, concluded
that ifa majority-minority district could be created-containing over
fifty percent minority voting-age population, or roughly sixty-five per-
cent total population-it had to be created, at least where significant
racial bloc voting could be demonstrated.2 Indeed, some courts and
24 Gingles, 478 U.S. at 50-51.
2 These factors included:
1. The history of voting-related discrimination in the state or political subdivision;
2. The extent to which voting in the elections of the state or political subdivision is ra-
cially polarized;
3. The extent to which the state or political subdivision has used voting practices or pro-
cedures that tend to enhance the opportunity for discrimination against the minority
group, such as unusually large election districts, majority vote requirements, and prohi-
bitions against bullet voting;
4. The exclusion of members of the minority group from candidate slating processes;
5. The extent to which minority group members bear the effects of past discrimination
in areas such as education, employment, and health, which hinder their ability to par-
ticipate effectively in the political process;
6. The use of overt or subtle racial appeals in political campaigns, and;
7. The extent to which members of the minority group have been elected to public of-
fice in the jurisdiction.
Id. at 44-45.
Growe v. Emison, 507 U.S. 25, 40-41 (1993); Voinovich v. Quilter, 507 U.S. 146, 157-58
(1993). As a practical matter, however, the Gingles test is not nearly as easy to apply when it
comes to single-member districts. For a good discussion of the evolution of the case-law before
and after Gingles, see BERNARD GROFMAN, ET AL., MINORITY REPRESENTATION AND THE QUEST
FORVOTINGEQUALrIY 4-21, 61-81 (1992) [hereinafter GROFMAN, MINORITYREPRESENTATION].
See, e.g., Jeffers v. Clinton, 730 F. Supp. 196 (E.D. Ark. 1989), afl'd, 498 U.S. 1019 (1991);
Garza v. County of Los Angeles, 756 F. Supp. 1298 (C.D. Cal. 1990), affd in part, vacated in part,
918 F.2d 763 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1028 (1991). As a rule of thumb, over fifty
percent minority voting-age population translated into approximately sixty-five percent total
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minority organizations broadened the argument to suggest that if a
state could produce a "minority-influenced" district, in which minority
voters existed in sufficient numbers (albeit less than a majority) to in-
fluence an election, creating such a district might be mandated by
the Voting Rights Act.28 Frank Parker, senior voting rights lawyer at
the Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law, declared in the
summer of 1991: "[W]e have the law more on our side than ever be-
fore."2
By the time redistricting had moved into the 1990's, race claims
were poised to dominate. the reasons were threefold. First, com-
puters had entered the scene, replacing pads of paper, pencils, and
cartographers who had previously drawn maps by hand, and permit-
ting the creation of districts with far smaller population deviations.
The ability of computers to generate an endless array of possible re-
apportionment configurations, within specified levels of population
deviation, made it fairly easy to bring maps within the guidelines that
had been established by the federal courts over the prior three dec-
ades. Indeed, the federal courts had largely thrashed out what popu-
lation differences were permissible under the Constitution. "One-
person-one-vote," in other words, was no longer a significant chal-
lenge for any sophisticated map-making operation. Second, with the
1982 congressional amendments to the Act and the Court's decision
in Gingles, what a voting rights plaintiff needed to prove in order to
succeed became much more straightforward. Third, census data was
broken down on a block-by-block basis rather than by tract and new
software permitted the use of racial data to manipulate districts with
minority population. See NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, REAPPORTIONMENT
1AW: THE 1990'S 62 (1989).
The notion of "minority-influenced" districts was prompted by Justice O'Connor's con-
currence in Gingles, in which she seemed to specifically leave open the possibility of requiring
such districts under the Act, stating-
I express no view as to whether the ability of a minority group to constitute a majority in
a single-member district should constitute threshold requirement for a claim [under
Section 2] ... I note, however, the artificiality of the Court's distinction between claims
that a minority group's "ability to elect the representatives of [its] choice" has been im-
paired and claims that "its ability to influence elections" has been impaired.
Gingles, 478 U.S. at 89-90 n.1 (O'ConnorJ., concurring) (citations omitted).
A federal court in Ohio had recently added support to the suggestion that such "influence"
districts might be required under Gingles. See Armour v. Ohio, 895 F.2d 1078 (6th Cir. 1990),
vacated on other grounds, 925 F.2d 987 (6th Cir. 1991). See also Armour v. Ohio, 775 F. Supp.
1044 (N.D. Ohio 1991). One noted scholar predicted that when the time came, the Supreme
Court would embrace the requirement of "influence" districts under Section 2 of the Act. See
also Pamela S. Karlan, Maps and Misreadings: The Role of Geographic Compactness in Racial Vote Di-
lutionLitigation, 24 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 173,206 n.129 (1989).
Stuart Taylor, Jr., Electing by Race, AM LAW., June 1991, at 54; Ken Gormley, Reapportioning
Election Districts: An Exercise in Political Self-Preservation, USA TODAY MAG., Jan. 1997, at 22, 24
[hereinafter Gormley, ReapportioningElection Districts].
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precision never before imagined.30 Race claims, with minority groups
as both plaintiffs and defendants, mushroomed in number.1
Across the United States, the Gingles decision produced odd alli-
ances and strange bedfellows as groups scrambled to turn the Su-
preme Court's ruling into political advantage. Nationwide, the Re-
publican Party adopted a strategy of aligning with the NAACP and
other minority groups to push for apportionment plans that created
new majority-minority districts and "minority-influenced" districts in
urban areas. The political calculus was overt: creating such minority
districts would simultaneously produce new Republican-friendly dis-
tricts in heavily white suburbs. The Democratic Party, not used to
finding itself opposing civil rights organizations, struggled to con-
vince minority groups not to abandon the party that had traditionally
been their base;33 yet, it was forced to sheepishly don its armor and go
into battle, fighting to preserve control of its Democratic turf. Under
President George H.W. Bush, the Justice Department aggressively
sought to support voting rights litigation in federal courts. John
Dunne, then the head of the Department's Civil Rights Division, ad-
mitted that his vigorous enforcement policies "may have the effect" of
helping the Republican party. Yet Dunne stressed that his sole mo-
tive was "to enforce the law in very strong, vigorous terms," as Con-
gress had intended.34
B. Racial Skirmishing and Cynical Alliances
In Pennsylvania, as the 1991 reapportionment got underway, the
Legislative Reapportionment Commission faced the full impact of
Gingles. In Philadelphia, where African-American and Latino popula-
tions were sizeable, the Senate Republican caucus pushed aggressively
for redistricting maps that maximized the voting strength of minori-
ties by adding one or two majority-minority districts, while wreaking
havoc on prime Democratic territory and creating the prospect of
one or two new Republican seats in the predominantly-white suburbs.
Democrats in the state Senate staunchly opposed such "pro-minority"
30 See, e.g., Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 961-62 (1996) (describing use of the REDAPPL com-
puter program that contained block-by-block racial data permitting redistricting officials to
make "intricate refinements" on the basis of race).
31 For a useful discussion of this period, see Bernard Grofman, Would Vince Lombardi Have
Been Right If He Had Said: "When It Comes to Redistricting, Race Isn't Everything, It's the Only Thing",
14 CARDOZO L. REV. 1237 (1993).
See id. See also Abigail M. Thernstrom, Redistricting. Civil Rights Groups--GOP Partners in
Quota Conspiracy, PHOENIX GAZETIE, Oct. 3, 1991, at A13; Ronald H. Brown & Daniel Hays
Lowenstein, A Democratic Perspective on Legislative Districting, 6J.L. & POL 673, 675-80 (1990).
33 See Chuck Alston, Democrats Court Minorities to Counter GOP's Pitch, CONG. Q., May 4, 1991,
at 1103.
Taylor, supra note 29, at 52.
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plans. Yet for reasons unclear initially, they opposed alternative maps
that would boost minority strength in Philadelphia, even those that
seemed to pose no threat to the Democratic Party. One particularly
attractive compromise had been offered by the Commission Chair-
man, Robert J. Cindrich (a prominent Pittsburgh attorney, now a
federal judge) that seemed to accommodate minority groups without
diluting Democratic strength in the Philadelphia area. The Senate
Democratic caucus, nonetheless, dug in and refused to budge.
In this domain, where race and politics intersected, much of the
political strategizing was counter-intuitive. Among the first groups
that stepped forward to oppose the creation of new African-American
House and Senate districts were the Black Legislative Caucus and sev-
eral minority interest groups in Philadelphia. The ostensible reason
for this opposition was to avoid "further segregat[ing] the African-
American community from the body politic of Philadelphia. '' 5 Yet it
became increasingly evident that minority legislators in both the
House and Senate, some of whom occupied districts with African-
American populations as high as eighty or ninety percent, did not
wish to give up those enormously favorable margins (at least initially),
even in the name of creating additional majority-minority seats.-
Democratic caucus members also opposed the creation of addi-
tional minority seats, as we discovered during the course of frank,
late-night discussions in the Reapportionment Commission office,
due to competing pressures from other groups. Much opposition
came from Italian-Americans and other groups in Philadelphia who
expressed vocal dissatisfaction with the possibility that African-
Americans would receive "more than their share" of clout in the legis-
lature. Numerous ethnic and racial groups, it turned out, were lobby-
ing for maps that gave themselves additional political strength.37
In the House, the resistance to drawing minority districts was par-
ticularly puzzling. Republicans sought to create additional minority
seats in Philadelphia, in a fairly balanced fashion, without driving a
knife into the heart of Democrat strongholds. Yet the Democratic
caucus adamantly opposed any map that had not been generated by
its own computer. It informed the Chairman and Executive Director
that it had retained a "voting rights expert," who had scrupulously re-
viewed every square inch of every proposed map. The plans submit-
ted by the Democrats, caucus leaders insisted, while not maximizing
Transcript of Legislative Reapportionment Commission Public Meetings at 20 (Nov. 15,
1991) (Pennsylvania State Archives) (remarks of Senator Robert Mellow, reading from letter
submitted by Senator RoxanneJones); GORMLEY, REAPPORTIONMENT, supra note 5, at 50.
Gormley, ReapportioningElection Districts, supra note 29, at 24.
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minority representation, carefully complied with the letter and the
spirit of federal law.
The decision whether to intentionally create one additional
Philadelphia majority-minority seat in the Senate and several major-
ity-minority seats in the House (along with a strong minority-
influenced seat for the Latino community) turned out to be the most
difficult of the entire reapportionment process. The Chairman and I
opened direct communications with the Pennsylvania Legislative
Black Caucus, the NAACP's National Redistricting Project, the Phila-
delphia Latino Voting Rights group, and other minority organiza-
tions that had displayed an interest in participating in the process.
Our goal was to identify, in advance, those plans that yielded the fair-
est results for the minority groups themselves, once stripped of the
lacquer of partisan politics. The Commission also hired Dr. Richard
L. Engstrom of the University of New Orleans, a nationally recog-
nized expert in Voting Rights Act analysis, to provide guidance as to
the most appropriate configurations in light of the Gingles decision
and the commands of the Voting Rights Act and the Fifteenth
Amendment.M
At the early public hearings, a spokesperson for the NAACP took
the position that, in light of Gingles, the Commission was obligated to
create majority-minority districts and "minority-influenced" districts
wherever it could. "Any action that results in the dilution of the black
community's voting strength," the NAACP spokesperson stated, "is a
violation of the Act."
3 9
At the same time, the Commission was extremely mindful of, and
impressed by, the testimony of Professor Abigail Thernstrom at an
early public hearing on proposed redistricting maps. Dr. Themstrom
had received her Ph.D. from Harvard, was an adjunct Professor of po-
litical science at Boston University, and the author of Whose Votes
Count?: Affirmative Action and Minority Voting Rights.4° The premise of
this acclaimed but controversial book and the subject of Dr. Thern-
strom's forceful testimony was that the Voting Rights Act should not
be utilized to institute "de facto apartheid."4  Dr. Themstrom took
38 GORMLEY, REAPPORTIONMENT, supra note 5, at 48-50.
Transcript of Public Hearings of the Pennsylvania Legislative Reapportionment Commis-
sion at 10 (Sept. 5, 1991) (Pennsylvania State Archives); GORMLEY, REAPPORTIONMENT, supra
note 5, at 29-30. See also Charles S. Bullock, III & Richard E. Dunn, Te Demise of Racial District-
ing and the Future of Black Representation, 48 EMORY L.J. 1209, 1210 (1999) (stating that "by the
early 1990's it had become an article of faith with the Department of Justice and many civil
rights advocates that [the Act] required the creation of majority-minority electoral units when-
ever feasible").
40 ABIGAIL M. THERNSTROM, WHOSE VOTES COUNT?.: AFFIRMATIVE AcTION AND MINORrIY
VOTING RIGHTS (1987).
41 Transcript of Public Hearings at 18 (Sept. 5, 1991) (Pennsylvania State Archives);
GORMLEY, REAPPORTIONMENT, supra note 5 at 30.
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the position that the 1982 amendments to the Voting Rights Act were
not designed to force reapportionment bodies to draw the maximum
number of "safe" minority districts, or to engage in affirmative "racial
gerrymandering." Nor did the Gingles decision, she believed, require
such a course. Rather, the new emphasis on creating minority dis-
tricts wherever possible was built upon the faulty assumption that
"whites can't represent blacks and blacks can't represent whites."42
Thernstrom believed that following such a course would cause
American society to "walk backwards on the race relations front to-
wards a more racially divided society," to the ultimate detriment to
minority groups in the political process.4 Dr. Thernstrom strongly
urged that Pennsylvania and other states not "cave in" to what she de-
scribed as the "cynical alliance between Republicans and civil rights
groups on voting rights matters." Ultimately, she concluded, this sort
of racial gerrymandering would produce negative ramifications for
black citizens across the nation.4
Dr. Thernstrom's testimony and the message that it so forcefully
conveyed caused us months of anguish over the wisdom of intention-
ally creating new minority districts. Ultimately, three events con-
vinced the Chairman and me that it was essential to take this step.
1. A Tour of Philadelphia
As part of the fact-gathering process, the Reapportionment Com-
mission toured Philadelphia in a van. We observed first-hand the
minority communities that were potentially affected by the new redis-
tricting map before meeting with the Philadelphia Chapter of the
NAACP at its Urban Education Center. We then drove through that
portion of the city dominated by Latino and mixed Latino/African-
American populations. The Commission met with members of the
Philadelphia Latino Voting Rights Committee at their office in Centro
Transcript of Public Hearings at 22 (Sept. 5, 1991) (Pennsylvania State Archives).
43 Id. at 24.
44 Id. at 24, 32-33, 49. A similar theme had been sounded by prominent African-Americans
includingJohn E.Jacob, President of the National Urban League, during his keynote address to
that organization's membership at their annual conference in Atlanta. SeeJohn E. Jacob, Ad-
dress at Keynote Session, National Urban League Annual Conference (July 21, 1991) (transcript
on file with author). Mr.Jacobs commented:
Right now congressional district lines are being redrawn by state legislatures. With the
help of technical experts from the Republican Party, some districts are being reshaped to
rope in as many African-American voters as possible. Some think that's a great idea-
creating all-black districts to ensure election of black representatives. But we have to ask
if this isn't a new form of political apartheid-assuring some safe congressional seats for
blacks at the cost of losing influence with legislators from adjoining districts.
Id. at 8. For an eloquent reply to the general theme sounded by Professor Thernstrom, see
Pamela S. Karlan, Loss and Redemption: Voting Rights at the Turn of a Century, 50 VAND. L. REV.
291, 298-301 (1997) [hereinafter Karlan, Loss and Redemption].
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Pedro Claver.45 What was sobering about this tour of the Philadelphia
Latino community was the extreme poverty that was evident once we
crossed the line into the Latino neighborhoods. There were aban-
doned cars on the streets, fire hydrants knocked over making them
inoperable, and school buildings disintegrating with no evidence of
repairs in recent decades. When we met with members of the Latino
organization, one Commission member asked if their neighborhood
had always been in such distress. Chairperson Patricia DeCarlo an-
swered: 'Yes. This is what happens if you have no influence in Har-
risburg. Funding comes from political clout. We don't have any of
that. We don't want special privileges-we just want you to draw lines
around us, where we live, so we have the same political power that
every other group has."
It quickly became evident that the Latino community was not ask-
ing the Commission to pervert the redistricting process in order to
give its members unfair advantages in drawing districts. To the con-
trary, the Latino community simply wished to have lines drawn
around their existing homes and communities to reflect their genu-
ine presence as a politically and socially cohesive group. Like many
other groups in Philadelphia that lobbied hard to be "kept intact" in
the new legislative maps, they wished to exert some measure of influ-
ence in the Pennsylvania legislature. Indeed, it was through past ef-
forts to quietly but systematically drive wedges through their commu-
nities and splinter them into unrelated districts-to benefit other
groups that had access to legislators-that the burgeoning Latino
community in Philadelphia had been routinely blocked from electing
representatives of choice. This translated into tangible proof of the
Latino community's political powerlessness, which was in full view as
we toured the depressed Latino section of Philadelphia.
2. The House's "Voting Rights Expert"
In drafting proposed maps for new House districts, the House
Democrats had insisted that, while their configurations did not
maximize minority representation, they were scrupulously con-
structed in compliance with the Voting Rights Act. Indeed, the
Democratic staffers had reassured us that they had gone to the trou-
ble of hiring a voting rights expert, whose job it was to review the
maps and to confirm that they had complied with federal law.
After staying up late in a hotel room one night pondering maps
and population data ourselves, the Chairman and I were puzzled
about certain racial demographics. We paid a visit to the Democratic
staff offices in the Capitol building to voice our concerns. When we
45 GORMLEY, REAPPORTIONMENT, supra note 5, at 31-32.
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requested to meet with the Democratic caucus's voting rights expert,
there was an uncomfortable silence. The Democratic staffer vanished
for several minutes. He returned with a flushed face, then ushered us
into a vacant computer room, where he introduced us to a white in-
cumbent House member from Philadelphia whose seat was in jeop-
ardy. This legislator occupied a district that was increasingly domi-
nated by African-Americans, but had created preliminary maps that
had managed to steer blacks into adjoining areas and maintain a safe
seat for himself. This was the Democratic caucus's "voting rights ex-
pert."6 Needless to say, we found more inequities in the proposed
House maps once we returned to the hotel.
3. The Ugliest Night
The most sobering lesson about the practical interplay between
race and reapportionment came one night, just past midnight, in the
ornate legislative chambers within the Capitol building. The Chair-
man and I had re-worked the numbers in the House plan and had
concluded that fairness and the Voting Rights Act dictated that two
new majority-minority seats should be created in Philadelphia to cor-
rect the obvious pattern of drafting districts to protect white incum-
bents by "splitting" or "packing" black voters. Then-Speaker Robert
O'Donnell volunteered to increase the African-American population
in his own district, converting it into a majority-minority district. For
the second district, we identified a predominantly African-American
area of Philadelphia that had been gerrymandered to allow an in-
cumbent white legislator to cling to his seat. The Speaker was willing
to make modifications to this incumbent legislator's district, on one
condition: the Chairman and I had to make the telephone call to the
legislator in question. It was our duty to break the unhappy news to
him.
We sat in the plush office of one of the House leaders as a large
mahogany clock ticked in the corner. Cigars were passed out, for
those who indulged. I dialed the number while the Chairman picked
up a second phone on the same line. It rang a dozen times before a
voice answered. The Philadelphia legislator had been asleep. After
the Chairman and I introduced ourselves, there was a half-hearted at-
tempt at pleasantries. Then we delivered the news-the minority
population in the legislator's district would increase by six percentage
points. This would bring it in line, the Chairman explained, with the
actual minority population, which was growing steadily in that area of
Philadelphia.
See Gormley, ReapportioningElection Districts, supra note 29, at 25.
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There was a long silence. We could hear the legislator rummag-
ing around in a drawer and extricating a piece of paper. He returned
to the phone and barked: "What the hell. Those ain't the numbers
they promised me." The Chairman replied that there had been no
promises of which he was aware. Any promises made without his ap-
proval did not count.
The legislator replied: "Look, I'm a white mother-f-er from
Philadelphia. And I don't want no more blacks or Spics in my dis-
trict.
47
Of course, he got exactly what the Chairman said he got, because
the Chairman held the tie-breaking vote on the final reapportion-
ment plan. Yet that incident convinced me, in a world where race
was inseparable from partisan politics, that it was essential to have a
Voting Rights Act. Moreover, it was essential for redistricting bodies
to keep one eye on that statute in order to ensure rudimentary fair-
ness towards minority groups. Otherwise, numerous other groups,
particularly those in power, would consciously manipulate lines in
order to advantage their own interests at the expense of the interests
of minority groups, with few fingerprints left on the computer key-
boards that create state legislative maps.
C. The Intentional Creation of Minority Districts in Philadelphia
Ultimately, a final plan was forged at the Chairman's insistence,
despite resistance from both political parties, that created additional
minority seats in both the House and Senate in Philadelphia. The
Commission's actual voting rights expert, Dr. Richard Engstrom,
conducted regression analyses-the method commonly utilized in
the field and conducted in Gingles-to determine where the Commis-
sion would most likely be vulnerable to legitimate challenges under
the Voting Rights Act. Particularly in Philadelphia, and to a lesser ex-
tent in Pittsburgh and Harrisburg,4 Dr. Engstrom explained where
districts might be created that would allow African-Americans and La-
tinos to elect candidates of choice, based upon those groups' natural
population patterns. Additionally, he demonstrated how this could
be done without abandoning traditional reapportionment principles
such as compactness and contiguity.
Dr. Engstrom's analysis of the data indicated that a voting rights
plaintiff would have little difficulty in establishing the three basic
Gingles pre-conditions in Philadelphia, Pittsburgh, or Harrisburg. In-
deed, like most experts in this field with whom we consulted, Dr.
Engstrom was confident that establishing the three Gingles pre-
47 I so48 See discussion of the three Gingles pre-conditions supra note 24.
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conditions as a predicate for a voting rights suit was a relatively
straight-forward task in most urban areas in the United States where
significant minority populations existed.49
When the Commission convened on November 15, 1991 to vote
on a final plan, House Democratic and Republican leaders agreed to
accept a new map that created two additional majority-minority Afri-
can-American House districts in Philadelphia, one majority-minority
Latino seat, and a seat with a strong Latino influence (30.6%) in that
segment of the city where the Latino community was growing rap-
idly.?
In the Senate, despite opposition from the Democratic and Re-
publican caucuses, both of which voted against the final plan, the
map contained only one new majority-minority seat (rather than
three) that contained roughly sixty percent African-American popula-
tion. The plan also contained a separate district that encompassed
the bulk of the Latino population (23%), to keep that minority group
intact within a single senatorial district. This map stood in sharp con-
trast to earlier Democratic plans that had packed black voters into
three districts and split Latino voters randomly. It also stood in con-
trast to Republican plans that had created a fourth "majority-
minority" district by aggregating African-Americans and Latinos into
a single district (despite the fact that these two minority groups, ac-
cording to Dr. Engstrom's analysis, did not vote cohesively). Not sur-
prisingly, the failed Republican plans would have created a fertile
new Republican district on the fringe of the Philadelphia suburbs.,5
Chairman Cindrich stated at the conclusion of the raucous hear-
ings:
I have done what I perceived to be myjob, and I think it is my job to be
the person who looks out for interest that would not otherwise be pro-
tected. It is the legitimate function of the political parties, both Republi-
can and Democrat, to press their interests and to press them hard, to
gain political advantage where they can, and it's my job to see that the
voter is protected. It's my job to see that the minorities are protected
and that the Constitution is adhered to. And in doing so, that sometimes
doesn't make the parties happy at all.5
Even with that vote on the final reapportionment plan, the racial
jockeying was not over. A Voting Rights Act suit was immediately
filed in federal court, alleging that the final map in Philadelphia
GOP f-EY, REAPPORIONMENr, supra note 5, at 49.
0 Transcript of Legislative Reapportionment Commission Public Meetings at 20, 106-09
(Nov. 15, 1991) (Pennsylvania State Archives); GORMIEY, REAPPORTIONMENT, supra note 5, at
50.
51 Id. at 50-51.
52 Id. at 52; Transcript of Legislative Reapportionment Commission Hearing at 103-04 (Nov.
15, 1991) (Pennsylvania State Archives).
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failed to adequately protect minority voters.53 Once again, race and
politics were inextricably intertwined, just as they had been during
intra-Commission skirmishing. The Commission's lawyer obtained a
written stipulation after conducting depositions that the six plaintiffs
had no independent knowledge relating to the lawsuit. Indeed, they
all admitted that they had been recruited by the Executive Director of
the Republican City Committee in Philadelphia, based upon the the-
ory that the final plan "did not create adequate opportunities for Re-
publican candidates to win elections in Philadelphia's seven senato-
rial districts."'
U.S. DistrictJudge John P. Fullam held a brief trial and dismissed
the suit less than three months later, finding that the final plan "has
the unanimous support of all minority organizations" in the Phila-
delphia area which had actively participated in the reapportionment
process.55 Judge Fullam also found that the Commission's plan was
consistent with the dictates of the Voting Rights Act-although he
never found it necessary to decide if a violation of that Act had been
proven-because it furthered the legitimate interest of protecting
minority citizens in Philadelphia who would otherwise be silently
drawn into unfavorable positions in the redistricting map. To the
very end, race drove the reapportionment process in complicated
and counter-intuitive ways. Only through the conscious effort to pro-
tect the rights of racial minorities, whose sheer numbers in popula-
tion within certain areas of the state, particularly in Philadelphia,
warranted fair representation, was the rough-and-tumble political ex-
ercise of reapportionment kept relatively fair.
II. RACE AND REAPPORTIONMENT: TEN YEARS LATER
In the years following my experience as Executive Director of the
Pennsylvania Legislative Reapportionment Commission, I have come
to conclude that the approach of the NAACP and other minority or-
ganizations in the early 1990's was not necessarily the most produc-
tive one, even to advance those groups' own legitimate causes. Inter-
preting Gingles to mean that if a majority-minority district could be
created, it had to be created under the Voting Rights Act, led to the
construction of a series of tortured districts that did little to further
voting rights in the United States. The North Carolina congressional
district at issue in Shaw Iwas described as "irregular on its face,"'57 "bi-
Harrison v. Pa. Legislative Reapportionment Comm'n, No. 92-CV-0603, 1992 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 5315 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 21, 1992).
54 GORMLEY, REAPPORTIONMENT, supra note 5, at 62.
Harrison, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5315, at *2.
1Id. at *2-3.
57 Shawl, 509 U.S. 630, 642 (1993).
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zarre," and "unexplicable on grounds other than race."'  The Geor-
gia congressional district in Miller v. Johnsorn9 was declared a "mon-
strosity" by the Almanac of American Politics. 6° The revised North
Carolina district in Shaw It' was described by the trial court as "highly
irregular and geographically non-compact by any objective standard
that can be conceived"6 and characterized by ChiefJustice Rehnquist
as serpentine. The Texas redistricting plan under attack in Bush v.
Vera64 was dubbed "among the worst in the Nation" in terms of com-
pactness and regularity of shape, in a well-respected 1993 scholarly
study.6
The above Supreme Court cases exposed a counter-productive
pattern by which state legislatures and redistricting bodies cast tradi-
tional reapportionment principles to the wind in order to stretch,
twist, and distort ordinary boundary lines for the express purpose of
putting unnatural conglomerations of minority voters in a single dis-
trict. These extreme cases undoubtedly resulted, in part, from the
states' legitimate desire to avoid having their plans rejected by the
Justice Department, particularly in the South where preclearance was
required under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act. States also feared
costly, unpleasant litigation with the NAACP and other minority or-
ganizations under Section 2 of the Act.66 Yet the result was one that
frequently exalted race over all other factors and yielded unsightly,
freakish districts that did not necessarily advance minority rights in a
society increasingly seeking a race-neutral base line.67
At the same time, the subtext that began creeping into those Su-
preme Court opinions invalidating extreme districts and the scholarly
commentary that grew up around them were equally troublesome.
One new theme that developed in the mid and late-1990's was that
racial considerations and reapportionment might be mutually exclu-
sive. The subtle message became that it was illegitimate (as a general
58 Id. at 644.
515 U.S. 900 (1995).
6o Id. at 909.
61 517 U.S. 899 (1996).
6 Id. at 905-06.
6 Id. at 906.
6 517 U.S. 952 (1996).
Id. at 960 (citing Richard H. Pildes & Richard G. Niemi, Expressive Harms, "Bizarre Districts,"
and Voting Rights: Evaluating Election-District Appearances After Shaw v. Reno, 92 MICH. L. REV.
483, 571-73 tbl. 6 (1993)). Some members of the Court, however, took the position that the
bizarre-shaped districts were primarily the result of political considerations, not racial factors.
See, e.g., Bush, 517 U.S. at 1003-04 (StevensJ., dissenting).
For a discussion of the interplay of Sections 2 and 5 of the Act, see infra note 129.
For one critique of this "maximization" approach, see MAURICE T. CUNNINGHM,
MAXIMIATION, WHATEVER THE COST: RACE, REDISTRICTING AND THE DEPARTMENT OFJUSTICE
157-59 (2001).
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rule) to consider race as a factor in creating reapportionment maps,
even in order to protect and ensure fairness to racial minorities.6
This sort of "no racial considerations allowed" approach is consti-
tutionally hazardous and politically impractical. First, it ignores the
fact that, when considering the dictates of one-person-one-vote in a
racial context, both the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments come
into play. This produces a double-barreled constitutional command,
which requires careful footwork by the courts in order to avoid being
shot in the leg by either. Although Fourteenth Amendment juris-
prudence has generally moved towards a concept of absolute race
neutrality and the imposition of strict scrutiny whenever governmen-
tal classifications are based upon race, even for the presumed benefit.... 69
of racial minorties, the law is not nearly as cut-and-dry in the reap-
portionment sphere. Unlike traditional equal protection claims in-
volving other forms of governmental conduct, "electoral districting
calls for decisions that nearly always require some consideration of
race for legitimate reasons where there is a racially mixed popula-
tion."7° This is true because the Fifteenth Amendment and the Vot-
ing Rights Act place unique, affirmative responsibilities upon states to
correct past patterns of injustice with respect to minority voting.
Significantly, the thresholds for establishing violations of the Vot-
ing Rights Act are quite different than those under the Fourteenth
Amendment. Rather than requiring proof of intentional discrimina-
tion, which is the ordinary standard in Fourteenth Amendment equal• • •71
protection jurisprudence, the Voting Rights Act was specifically
amended by Congress in 1982 to make clear that its protections were
triggered based upon mere discriminatory results, a much easier
standard for plaintiffs to establish. Thus, the "no racial considera-
tions allowed" notion places reapportionment bodies in an impossi-
ble position. On the one hand, these bodies must be cognizant of
the Fifteenth Amendment and the Voting Rights Act, which place
upon them an obligation to safeguard the voting rights of minority
citizens. On the other hand, the "no racial considerations allowed"
notion suggests that reapportionment officials should be prepared to
walk into court and swear that they did not affirmatively take race
into account. Such an inconsistent set of commands ends up paralyz-
ing state legislatures and apportionment bodies. It leads to disin-
genuity and, in certain instances, outright deception by voting rights
68 Bush, 517 U.S. at 999-1000, 1002-03 (Thomas, J., concurring); Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S.
900, 904-05 (1995); Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541,546 (1999). See alsoJones, supra note 7.
See, e.g., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976); Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev.
Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977); Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
10 Shaw , 509 U.S. at 680 (Souter, J., dissenting).
71 See, e.g., Washington, 426 U.S. at 229, Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 252.
7 See discussion supra notes 22-29 and accompanying text.
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lawyers and their clients. It also leads to puzzling Supreme Court de-
cisions that fail to create workable standards for those in the thick of
reapportionment travails.
Second, the "race may not be considered" approach is premised
upon a false assumption that compliance, or non-compliance, with
the Voting Rights Act and the Fifteenth Amendment is a one-shot
deal that only justifies consideration of racial fairness when a viola-
tion of those provisions has been definitively proven. Such a rigid
view of how voting rights are safeguarded is off the mark. Compli-
ance with the Voting Rights Act, and with the Fifteenth Amendment
which undergirds it, is necessarily an ongoing, incremental process.
The goal cannot be to wait until districts drift into skewed, illegal, ra-
cially-imbalanced configurations over time, which is what occurred
during the first hundred years after the adoption of the Reconstruc-
tion-era Fifteenth Amendment. The goal cannot be to wait until
plaintiffs sue the reapportionment body and conclusively prove viola-
tions of the three Gingles pre-conditions (a fairly easy task in most ur-
ban areas, as any voting rights expert will confirm) and the "totality of
the circumstances" test (a more elusive, imprecise hurdle) before al-
lowing redistricting bodies to ponder issues of fairness to minority
groups. Rather, compliance with the Fifteenth Amendment and the
Voting Rights Act, which Congress enacted pursuant to its broad en-
forcement provisions under that Amendment, require constant vigi-
lance. Reapportionment bodies must constantly be on the alert to
ensure that lines are being drawn around racial minorities with the
same fairness and consistency as applies to all other citizens. Had the
Commission Chairman not consciously and intentionally taken race
into account in constructing districts in Pennsylvania that were reflec-
tive of the interests of minorities a decade ago, nod-and-wink politics
and the subtle maneuvering of district lines behind closed doors
would have taken race into account in the opposite fashion, i.e., to
intentionally produce districts unfair to African-Americans and Lati-
nos.
The Court's new portfolio of post-Gingles reapportionment cases,
beginning with Shaw v. Reno in 1993, has been sensible in its overall
theme. Creating districts in which geographically-distant minorities
who have little in common other than skin color are lumped to-
gether, simply for the sake of creating majority-minority districts
wherever mathematically possible, would have accomplished little in
furtherance of voting rights in the United States, even if such districts
had survived. In the words of Justice O'Connor in Shaw I, extreme
forms of racial gerrymandering in redistricting pose a serious danger
of "balkaniz[ing] us into competing racial factions; it threatened to
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carry us further from the goal of a political system in which race no
longer matters .... 73 Or, as Justice Kennedy correctly noted in Miller
v. Johnson,74 the noble end envisioned by the Framers of the Fifteenth
Amendment and the Voting Rights Act "[was] neither assured nor
well served... by carving electorates into racial blocs." n At the very
least, the strained construction of such districts creates the public
perception of crass racial gerrymandering, which is not particularly
healthy for a society seeking to move away from that history.
All concerned were wrong in embarking upon this course of
maximizing minority districts in order to accomplish self-interested
political objectives. Both political parties sought to extract advantage
from this approach, but it did not necessarily serve the best interests
of any of those whose rights were at stake.' Yet the "race as a pre-
dominant factor" test introduced by Miller to correct this dysfunction
has drifted into inconsistent corridors, creating confusion and en-
couraging dishonesty among lower courts and legislators charged
with decoding it. The lingering suggestion that all intentionally cre-
ated majority-minority districts are bad, undesirable, and forbidden
by the Constitution, is equally non-productive. The secret to giving
the "predominant factor" test sharper and more useful boundaries is,
as a first step, to reconcile the separate commands of the Fourteenth
and Fifteenth Amendments.
III. THE DISTINCT ORIGINS OF ONE-PERSON-ONE-VOTE AND VOTING
RIGHTS CASES
A. One-Person-One-Vote and the Fourteenth Amendment
Lawyers, legal scholars, and interested observers at times suggest
that the landmark decisions that established the foundation of mod-
em reapportionment theory in the early 1960's-Baker v. Carr and
Reynolds v. Sims--were directly or indirectly designed to accomplish
Shaw I, 509 U.S. at 657.
74 515 U.S. 900 (1995).
. Id. at 927.
For an interesting example of how politics has driven these racial redistricting battles to
the bitter end, notwithstanding claims by both political parties that they supported the true in-
terests of racial minorities, see Shaw v. Hunt (Shaw I1), 517 U.S. 899, 920 (1996) (Stevens, J., dis-
senting) (describing how Republicans originally supported the creation of additional minority
districts in North Carolina, which Democrats opposed, because they favored Republican party
interests). When the Democratic plans to create additional minority seats prevailed, however,
the Republicans opposed these plans and became plaintiffs in the Shaw lawsuit. Thus, from the
start, political interests have driven the struggle for both parties, rather than unyielding con-
cerns for creating new minority districts.
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racial equality in voting." This, however, is a faulty reconstruction of
history.
Baker and Reynolds had little to do with securing black citizens the
right to vote, except incidentally. The push for the Court to enter
the reapportionment thicket and straighten out the gross inequities
that had developed in state and congressional apportionment maps
around the country in the 1950's, revolved almost entirely around
urban-rural party politics and federalism issues rather than race. One
of the earliest pieces of legal scholarship advocating that federal
courts jump into the reapportionment quagmire was authored by An-
thony Lewis, then a young reporter for the New York Times who cov-
ered the Supreme Court. Lewis, who had been a Nieman Fellow at
Harvard Law School, wrote in the Harvard Law Review that the fed-
eral judiciary should foreswear Justice Felix Frankfurter's logic articu-
lated in the 1946 decision of Colegrove v. Green." In that case, Justice
Frankfurter had taken the intractable position that any existing ineq-
uities in voting, resulting from failures to reapportion, amounted to a
political malady that only the legislative branch was constitutionally
authorized to correct.8° "Courts ought not to enter this political
thicket," Frankfurter wrote. "The remedy for unfairness in districting
is to secure State legislatures that will apportion properly, or to in-
voke the ample powers of Congress.""'
Lewis's counter to that argument sounded a theme that was gain-
ing increasing popularity in the legal literature in the late 1950's: the
federal courts were the only hope for correcting those injustices that
had run rampant after decades of failures to reapportion by state leg-
islative bodies m  During the period of rapid urbanization in the
United States since World War II, the political equilibrium had been
frozen in place, protecting the interests of those in power, who were
primarily located in rural areas. It was only the judicial branch, Lewis
argued, that was in a position to re-configure the equation and re-
store the soul of the Fourteenth Amendment, in order that every citi-
zen's right to vote count equally. Lewis wrote: "The federal courts
See, e.g., Jeanmarie K. Grubert, Note, The Rehnquist Court's Changed Reading of the Equal Pro-
teaion Clause in the Context of Voting Rights, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1819, 1830-32 (1997) (combin-
ing an analysis of the Shaw line of cases with the Baker and Reynolds line of cases from the early
1960's).
Anthony Lewis, Legislative Apportionment and the Federal Courts, 71 HARV. L. REV. 1057
(1958).
9 328 U.S. 549 (1946).
8 Justice Frankfurter's opinion, on this particular issue, spoke for only three of the seven
Justices who participated in that decision. A fourth Justice, Justice Rutledge, concurred in the
result. Colegrove, 328 U.S. at 564.
8 Id at 556.
2 Lewis, supra note 78, at 1095-96.
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cannot remake politics. But they can be a conscience, expressing
ideas which take root in public and political opinion."8
When Baker v. Carr wound its way onto the Supreme Court docket
in 1 9 62 84 for a second round of briefs and arguments, it was very
much on the radar screen of the Kennedy Justice Department. Yet
this attention was not because of any "racial equality" implications.
While serving as Senator from Massachusetts, President John F. Ken-
nedy had taken a strong position in favor of correcting injustices in
state apportionment schemes in a 1958 piece for the New York Times
Magazine.85 Then-Senator Kennedy had written: "[Tihe apportion-
ment of representation in our Legislatures and (to a lesser extent) in
Congress has been either deliberately rigged or shamefully ignored
so as to deny the cities and their voters that full and proportionate
voice in government to which they are entiled."'86 In addition, Attor-
ney General Robert F. Kennedy, who made the decision after taking
office to support the plaintiffs in the reapportionment cases, had
managed his brother's national Presidential campaign. He had seen
first-hand how the gross imbalances in state legislative apportionment
maps had hurt urban areas, which constituted prime Democratic
turf.87 Looking ahead to the 1964 Presidential election, RFK was de-
termined to straighten out this political inequity. Anthony Lewis, a
close personal friend of Robert Kennedy from Harvard undergrad
days, added momentum by lobbying the young Attorney General in
favor of the positions set forth in his Harvard Law Review piece.86
Neither Solicitor General Archibald Cox, who argued Baker and
Reynolds in the Supreme Court on behalf of the United States, nor
Burke Marshall, who served as the head of the Civil Rights Division in
the KennedyJustice Department, viewed these cases through a "racial
equality" lens. Indeed, they would later point out that when those
83 Id. at 1098. For other legal commentary in the pre-Baker period, which made clear that
the central issue in the reapportionment debate dealt with states' rights, federalism, and the
distribution of political power, see William L. Taylor, Legal Action To Enjoin Legislative Malappor-
tionment: The Political Question Doctrine, 34 S. CAL L. REV. 179 (1961); Note, Legislative Appor-
tionment: AJudicialDilemma, 15 RUTrGERSL. REV. 82 (1960).
84 See U.S. Asks High Court Review of Tennessee Apportionment, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 20, 1961, at 25.
85 John F. Kennedy, The Shame of the States, N.Y. TIMES MAG., May 18, 1958, at 18. See also
Oral history interview of Robert F. Kennedy & Burke Marshall, Dec. 4, 1964, at 575 (transcript
on file with theJohn F. Kennedy Library).
Kennedy, The Shame of the States, supra note 85, at 37.
87 See KEN GORML.EY, ARCHIBALD COX: CONSCIENCE OF A NATION 164 (1997) [hereinafter
GORMLEY, ARCHIBAID COX].
83 Oral History Interview with Archibald Cox at 18-5, 18-6 (1990) (Harvard Law School Li-
brag Special Collections).
For a discussion of Cox's role in grappling with and agonizing over the complex reappor-
tionment issues, see GORMLEY, ARCHIBALD COX, supra note 87, at 163-70, 171-77 (discussing
Baker v. Carr and Reynolds v. Sims). Shortly after Baker was decided, Cox wrote a piece for the
American Bar Association Journal reflecting upon the importance of that Supreme Court decision
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two landmark cases were fought to a conclusion in the Supreme
Court, racial minorities were still routinely disenfranchised in the
United States, particularly in the South, through poll taxes, literacy
tests, and other forms of overt discrimination.w Thus, until the Vot-
ing Rights Act of 1965 was enacted-after the assassination of Presi-
dent Kennedy-the notion of equalizing the right to vote for racial
minorities was not a realistic one. Racial considerations had little to
do with the evolution of the "one-person-one-vote," principle under
the Fourteenth Amendment.9l As Cox would later summarize: "I
don't think [race] was the impetus or the dominant thought. Obvi-
ously, we were aware that there would be some racial implications in
some cases. But that certainly wasn't our focus."92
B. Minority Rights: The Fifteenth Amendment
It is important to note, however, that there existed a small pocket
of jurisprudence under the Fifteenth Amendment, even before the
1960's, that dealt with the most egregious instances of denying blacks
the right to vote in state and federal elections. Section One of the
Fifteenth Amendment provides: "The right of citizens of the United
States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or
by any State on account of race, color, or previous condition of servi-
tude."" Section Two of that Reconstruction-era Amendment author-
izes Congress to enforce the provision by "appropriate legislation.""
In the late nineteenth-century cases United States v. Reese5 and Ex
Parte Yarbrough,9 the Supreme Court broadly interpreted the rights
in ensuring a sense of public confidence in the American political system. See Archibald Cox,
Current Constitutional Issues, 48 A.BA J. 711 (1962). For a glimpse of the Justice Department's
view of the significance of Baker, generally, it is worth reading the "Law Day" Speech of Nick
Katzenbach, Robert Kennedy's Deputy Attorney General, delivered at Vanderbilt University
School of Law. Nicholas deB. Katzenbach, Some Reflections on Baker v. Carr, 15 VAND. L. REV.
829 (1962). Katzenbach's speech focuses on federal-state relations, as well as the importance of
state legislatures adhering to the Supreme Court pronouncement and voluntarily carrying out
redistricting.
90 GOR IIEY, ARCHIBALD COX, supra note 87, at 164, 497 n.16.
91 It is noteworthy that in a major symposium in the Yale Law Journal in 1962, published im-
mediately following the Court's decision in Baker v. Carr, a parade of prominent legal scholars
and political science experts commented upon the significance of that landmark decision.
These included such notables as political scientist E.E. Schattschneider; Yale Law Professors
Charles L. Black, Alexander M. Bickel, Thomas I. Emerson, and Louis H. Pollak; and attorney
(later Justice) Arthur L. Goldberg. In this hundred-page symposium issue, there was virtually
no discussion of racial issues as they related to reapportionment. See A Symposium on Baker v.
Carr: Urbanization and Reapportionment, 72 YALELJ. 7 (1962).
Interview with Archibald Cox (Jan. 29, 2002) (on file with author).
93 U.S. CONT. amend. XV, § 1.
U.S. CONSr. amend. XV, § 2.
95 92 U.S. 214 (1875) (mem.).
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protected by the Fifteenth Amendment and Congress's ability to en-
force them. In Reese, ChiefJustice Waite stated that the newly-ratified
Fifteenth Amendment "has invested the citizens of the United States
with a new constitutional right which is within the protecting power
of Congress. That right is exemption from discrimination in the ex-
ercise of the elective franchise on account of race, color, or previous
condition of color."97 In Yarbrough, the Court declared: "The exer-
cise of the right [under the Fifteenth Amendment] ... is guaranteed
by the Constitution, and should be kept free and pure by congres-
sional enactments whenever that is necessary. '' 8
In the early twentieth century, the Supreme Court in Guinn v.
United State 9 invalidated a 1910 amendment to the Oklahoma Con-
stitution, which required a literary test for those registering and vot-
ing in elections, but exempting "lineal descendants" of Oklahoma
citizens entitled to vote before January 1, 1866. This provision effec-
tively "grandfathered in" whites, but excluded blacks since they could
not vote in 1866. The Supreme Court struck down this amendment
as violative of the Fifteenth Amendment. Chief Justice White, writing
for the Court, stated that "to hold that there was even possibility for
dispute on the subject would be but to declare that the Fifteenth
Amendment [did not have] the self-executing power which it has
been recognized to have from the beginning .... ,100 In a related
case, Lane v. Wilson,1' the Court invalidated an Oklahoma statute that
established a complex voter registration scheme which sought to
make it difficult for blacks to vote after the "grandfather clause" was
declared unconstitutional. Justice Frankfurter, writing for the Court
in Lane, specifically premised his decision on the Fifteenth Amend-
ment. He emphasized that that the Reconstruction-era Amendment
"nullifies sophisticated as well as simple-minded modes of discrimina-
tion."'02
In the 1940's, the Court again relied upon the Fifteenth Amend-
ment in protecting minority voting rights. In Schnell v. Davis, °3 the
Supreme Court in a per curiam opinion invalidated the discrimina-
tory application of voting tests, relying on both the Fourteenth and
110 U.S. 651 (1884) (denying the habeas corpus petitions ofJasper Yarbrough and seven
other persons who had been convicted of conspiring to interfere with an African-American man
voting in Georgia).
97 Reese, 92 U.S. at 218.
Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. at 665.
99 238 U.S. 347 (1915).
1oD 1d at 363.
101 307 U.S. 268 (1939).
l0 Id. at 275.
10 336 U.S. 933 (1949) (per curiam).
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Fifteenth Amendments. 04 In another landmark case, Smith v. All-
wright,'0 the Supreme Court invalidated the practice of white prima-
ries, squarely resting on the Fifteenth Amendment. In Allwright, the
Court knocked down a scheme by which the Democratic party in
Texas prohibited Negroes from voting in a primary election for can-
didates for U.S. Senate, House, Governor, and other state officers.
The Court wrote: "Here we are applying.., the well-established
principle of the Fifteenth Amendment, forbidding the abridgement
by a State of a citizen's right to vote. "1°6
One of the most relevant cases, Gomillion v. Lightfoot,0° decided in
1960, squarely tackled the issue of racial gerrymandering in the vot-
ing context, relying upon the Fifteenth Amendment. Gomillion in-
volved an Alabama statute that intentionally re-drew the boundaries
of the city of Tuskegee, "from a square to an uncouth twenty-eight-
sided figure," in such a way as to exclude virtually all qualified Negro
from voting in city elections. 04 The federal district court dismissed
the complaint on the ground that it presented a "political question"
that was not subject to judicial review. The Supreme Court reversed,
concluding that if the plaintiffs could prove that the Alabama statute
discriminated against Negro voters in redefining the city's bounda-
ries, they could make out a claim for denial of their right to vote un-
der the Fifteenth Amendment.10 9 The Court specifically distanced it-
self from the thorny "political questions" issue that was swirling
around the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause at that
time. Rather, the Court emphasized that this case indicated an al-
leged abridgement of the quite distinct Fifteenth Amendment right
to vote, based upon race.110 The Court wrote: "The petitioners here
complain that affirnative legislative action deprives them of their
votes and the consequent advantages that the ballot affords. When a
legislature thus singles out a readily isolated segment of a racial mi-
nority for special discriminatory treatment, it violates the Fifteenth
Amendment." '
104 SeeDavis v. Schnell, 81 F. Supp. 872 (S.D. Ala. 1949).
105 321 U.S. 649 (1944). See also Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953) (invalidating efforts by
the Jaybird Party in Texas-which did not permit Negroes to join-to circumvent Smith by es-
tablishing its own primaries).
10 Smith, 321 U.S. at 666.
107 364 U.S. 339, 340 (1960).
101 The statute changed the city, in shape, from a rectangle to a twenty-eight sided figure. As
a result, all but four or five Negro voters were drawn out of the city's new boundaries. Id. at
348. See generally Recent Cases, Constitutional Law---State Power To Realign Political Subdivisions Held
Limited by RfteenthAmendmen4 109 U. PA. L. REV. 1173 (1961).
109 Gomillion, 364 U.S. at 346.
110 Id. at 343, 345.
III Id. at 346.
May 2002]
JOURNAL OF CONSTITIONAL LAW
In Gomillion, Justice Frankfurter warned that the Fifteenth
Amendment should not be taken out of play simply because redis-
tricting was at issue: "The opposite conclusion, urged upon us by re-
spondents, would sanction the achievement by a State of any impair-
ment of voting rights whatever so long as it was cloaked in the garb of
the realignment of political subdivisions." Frankfurter concluded:
"It is inconceivable that guarantees embedded in the Constitution of
the United States may be manipulated out of existence." 2
C. The Voting Rights Act Is Born (1965)
Even before the civil rights movement of the 1960's, there existed
a small but sturdy body of case-law under the Fifteenth Amendment,
that struck down the most egregious efforts to eliminate, or burden,
the ability of blacks to vote. But the unique jurisprudence ensuring
equal voting rights to minorities did not solidify until the adoption of
the Twenty-Fourth Amendment in 1964,1 3 which banned poll taxes in
elections for federal officials, and the enactment of the Voting Rights
Act in 1965.
Early attempts at curbing abuses with respect to racial discrimina-
tion in the arena of voting, via statute, sputtered and failed during
the Kennedy Administration.1 4  As discussed above, there were a
handful of significant Supreme Court decisions over the years that
sought to correct overtly discriminatory voting practices by applying
the Fifteenth Amendment. At the same time, there were even more
instances in which the Supreme Court deferred to the states when it
came to voting practices that were blatantly discriminatory. Thus, in
Breedlove v. Suttles,1 1 5 the Supreme Court unanimously upheld a Geor-
gia statute requiring the payment of a one dollar poll tax as a prereq-
uisite for voting (designed, obviously, to discourage blacks from cast-
ing votes). The Court in Breedlove rejected challenges under the
12 Id at 345 (quoting Frost & Frost Trucking Co. v. R.R. Comm'n, 271 U.S. 583, 594 (1926)).
13 The Twenty-Fourth Amendment provides in relevant part: "The right of citizens of the
United States to vote in any primary or other election for President or Vice President, for elec-
tors for President or Vice President, or for Senator or Representative in Congress, shall not be
denied or abridged by the United States or any State by reason of failure to pay any poll tax or
other tax." U.S. CONST. amend. XXIV, § 1.
114 For a discussion of one unsuccessful piece of Kennedy Administration legislation that
sparked controversy, in seeking to forbid certain literacy tests (at a level above a sixth-grade
education) as a prerequisite for voting, see William W. Van Alstyne, The Administration's Anti-
Literacy Test Bill: Wholly Constitutional but Wholly Inadequate 61 MICH. L. REV. 805 (1963).
15 302 U.S. 277 (1937). Breedlove was overruled by Harper v. Virginia State Board of Elections,
383 U.S. 663 (1966). In Harper, the Court invalidated a Virginia statute that required payment
of a poll tax of up to $1.50, as a prerequisite to voting, finding this to constitute a violation of
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, based upon the notion that the
right to vote was a "fundamental" one.
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Fourteenth and Nineteenth Amendments, without ever addressing
the Fifteenth Amendment issues. It concluded that "[1] evy by the
poll has long been a familiar form of taxation," and found no conflict
with the U.S. Constitution. u6  In 1959, in Lassiter v. Northampton
County Board of Elections,117 the Court unanimously upheld a North
Carolina statute requiring a literacy test, i.e., the reading and writing
of selected lines from the state constitution, as a prerequisite to vot-
ing-another tried-and-true discriminatory tool. The Court in Las-
siter found that a literacy test, "on its face," did not "perpetuate that
discrimination which the Fifteenth Amendment was designed to up-
root" 118
Thus, in the pre-1960's jurisprudence, the cases relating to race
discrimination in voting were a mixed bag. A few cases, from Reese to
Gomillion, addressed extreme abuses, relying almost exclusively upon
the Fifteenth Amendment. 119 In many other cases, however, the
Court simply averted its judicial eyes, allowing states to continue in-
equitable practices.
As serious abuses persisted, it became clear that such racial voting-
rights problems had to be handled quite distinctly from the "one-
person-one-vote" issue. It also became inescapable, by the 1960's,
that Congress would have to enter the fray. The history, if one exam-
ined the record in the United States, was abysmal. Immediately after
the Civil War, for instance, Mississippi had isolated the bulk of its
black population in a "shoe-string" congressional district running the
length of the Mississippi River, leaving five other districts with white
majorities' 2° and effectively boxing Negroes out of the political proc-
ess. One hundred years later, things were not much better. In a
large number of voting districts, particularly in the South, state and
local authorities continued to engage in overtly-discriminatory prac-
tices such as ballot box stuffing, property requirements, poll taxes
(the "most effective bar to Negro suffrage ever devised"),121 white
primaries, at-large elections, runoff requirements, and other devices
specifically designed to restrict or squelch entirely the right to vote of
minority citizens.1
116 302 U.S. at 281.
11 360 U.S. 45 (1959).
118 Id. at 53.
119 As Archibald Cox would recall, in describing his early years as Solicitor General in the
Kennedy Administration: "I don't think we were talking about a Voting Rights Act yet. The
assumption was that the government still had to proceed jurisdiction by jurisdiction, or if possi-
ble state by state, to deal with discrimination of that sort." Interview with Archibald Cox (Jan.
29, 2002) (on file with author).
12D E. FONER, RECONSIRUGrON: AERICa'S UNFINISHED REVOLrION, 1863-1877 590 (1988).
121 A. SYONE, STUDIES IN THEAMERICAN RACEPROBLEM354-55 (1908).
12 See generalyJ.M. KOUSSER, THE SHAPING OF SOUTHERN POLTICS: SUFFRAGE RESIRCIION
AND THE ESrABLISHMENT OF THE ONE-PARTYSOTH, 1880-1910 (1974).
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There was some scholarly discussion, post-Reynolds, as to whether
the one-person-one-vote principle of the Fourteenth Amendment
might be extended to challenge multi-member electoral districts,
which existed in most states and inevitably disfavored minority
groupssss Yet this movement never took off. It was really not until
the adoption of the Voting Rights Act in 1965, grounded directly
upon the Fifteenth Amendment, that this distinct area of constitu-
tional jurisprudence involving minority voting rights began to take
root.
Many of the same individuals who had guided Baker and Reynolds
through the Supreme Court, played pivotal roles in shaping voting
rights legislation. By this time, in the mid-1960's, registration of black
voters ran nearly fifty percent behind that of white voters in some
states due to racially discriminatory voting practices. 24 Black legisla-
tors were nearly never elected, particularly in the South, because such
voting practices effectively prevented blacks from electing candidates
of choice.
Nicholas Katzenbach, who succeeded Robert Kennedy as Attorney
General, took the lead in drafting new legislation in the early months
of 1965, as the Johnson Administration sought to define itself12s
Katzenbach enlisted Solicitor General Cox to take a stab at fashioning
a statute that would withstand constitutional challenge in the Su-
preme Court. Katzenbach also re-enlisted Burke Marshall, who had
left the Justice Department after RFK's departure, to work as a con-
sultant on this special piece of legislation.1 This first piece of major
voting rights legislation since Reconstruction did not rely on the ge-
neric guarantee of "equal protection" contained in the Fourteenth
Amendment that had formed the underpinning for the "one-person-
one-vote" cases. Rather, it was anchored upon the more specific pro-
vision of the Fifteenth Amendment, which prohibited the states from
"denying" or "abridging" the right to vote based upon race.
One distinguishing feature of the Voting Rights Act, as it came to-
gether in early drafts, was that it switched the presumption against
states with a history of discrimination. Rather than placing the bur-
den upon individual plaintiffs-who typically possessed insufficient
resources to launch expensive and complex civil rights cases-the
123 For early scholarly discussion of this issue, which continued to rear its head for decades,
see Malcolm E. Jewell, Minority Representation: A Political or Judicial Question, 53 KY LJ. 267
(1965); John F. Banzhaf III, Multi-Member Electoral Districts: Do They Violate the "One Man, One
Vote"Principle, 75 YALE L.J. 1309 (1966).
124 See South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 313 (1966).
1Z GORMLEY, ARCHIBALD COX, supra note 87, at 190. President Johnson had announced in
his State of the Union address in January of 1965 that he would immediately send a refurbished
Voting Rights Act to Congress, although he had no such legislation in place.
12 GORMLEY, ARCHIBALD COX, supra note 87, at 190-91.
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United States government was permitted (under Section 4 of the Act)
to presume that literacy tests, poll taxes and other suspect devices were
designed to discriminate against black voters in those states that had
a history of excluding minorities from polling places.'2 As the Court
explained in South Carolina v. Katzenbach: "After enduring nearly a
century of resistance to the Fifteenth Amendment, Con-
gress... decided to shift the advantage of time and inertia from the
perpetrators of the evil to its victims."'2s Thus, Section 5 of the Act
required states with histories of discriminatory voting practices to
preclear any changes in such practices with a threejudge federal
court or the Attorney General of the United States.'29 Using the pow-
erful provisions of Sections 4 and 5, it became easier for the govern-
ment to police voting-rights abuses in states with poor track records.
In constructing those portions of the Act, Congress explicitly recog-
nized that certain subtle discriminatory practices had the effect of
"undo[ing] or defeat[ing] the rights recently won by nonwhite vot-
ers."i' ° Moreover, in conjunction with Section 2 of the Act, which ap-.
plied more broadly to all states (and later evolved into a key provision
of the Act), Congress chose to exercise its enforcement powers under
the Fifteenth Amendment in an "inventive" and expansive fashion,
127 Id. In other words, a low percentage of voter turnout combined with a suspect device
such as a "literacy test" or a "poll tax" would trigger a presumption that the state in question
had intentionally denied citizens the right to vote based upon race. For a complete text of the
Act as originally adopted, see Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 337 (Appendix to Opinion of the Court).
12 383 U.S. at 328.
1 Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act required certain state and local governments "covered"
by the Act to obtain "preclearance" from the U.S. Department of Justice or the U.S. District
Court for the District of Columbia before any changes in voting standards, practices, or proce-
dures could be made. 42 U.S.C. § 1973(c). Initially, the preclearance requirements were
placed on only a small number of jurisdictions that had maintained literacy tests and other
forms of blatant discrimination in voting qualifications as of the presidential election of 1964.
However, subsequent amendments in 1970, 1975, and 1982 expanded the reach of the Voting
Rights Act. By the time the 1990 decennial census arrived, twenty-two states or parts of states
were covered by Section 5 preclearance requirements. NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE
LEGISLATORS, REAPPORTIONMENrLAW: THE 1990'S 42-44 (1989); GORMLEY, REAPPORTIONMENt,
supra note 5, at 37. The remaining states (including Pennsylvania) which lacked a history of
overt discrimination in voting practices, were excused from preclearance. Yet they still fell
within the broader ambit of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. This provision, as amended,
prohibits any state or political subdivision from imposing any "voting qualification or prerequi-
site to voting or standard, practice, or procedure" that "results in a denial or abridgement of the
right of any citizen of the United States to vote on account of race or color," or status as a
member of a minority group. 42 U.S.C. § 1973(a). For a general discussion of the Voting
Rights Act, see BERNARD GROFMAN & CHANDLER DAVIDSON, CONTROVERSIES IN MINORITY
VOTING THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT IN PERSPECTIVE (1992); GROFMAN, MINORrTY
REPRESENTATION, supra note 26; HUDSON, supra note 12.
nm H.R. Rep. No. 91-397, at 8 (1969).
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giving minority plaintiffs ample latitude to prevail where evidence in-
dicated that their right to vote had been diluted.1
3'
The Voting Rights passed overwhelmingly in both the House and
the Senate.' 32 As Chief Justice Warren explained in Katzenbach:
"Congress concluded that the unsuccessful remedies which it had
prescribed in the past would have to be replaced by sterner and more
elaborate measures in order to satisfy the clear commands of the Fif-
teenth Amendment. " 133
Cox defended the Voting Rights Act with ease, in the seminal Su-
preme Court case of South Carolina v. Katzenbach.34 There, the Court
recognized that Section 5 was a constitutionally necessary and justifi-
able response to certain states' "extraordinary stratagem [s] of contriv-
ing new rules of various kinds for the sole purpose of perpetuating
voting discrimination in the face of adverse federal court decrees."'
As the Court later explained in Beer v. United States,'3 Congress had
legitimately exercised its broad power under the Fifteenth Amend-
ment "to shift the advantage of time and inertia from the perpetra-
tors of the evil to its victim," by "freezing election procedures in the
covered areas unless the changes can be shown to be nondiscrimina-
tory." 37 The Voting Rights Act was thus the first modern embodi-
ment of Congress's enforcement power under the Fifteenth Amend-
ment.'ss As Chief Justice Warren wrote in Katzenbach: "After
enduring nearly a century of widespread resistance to the Fifteenth
Amendment, Congress has marshaled an array of potent weapons
against the evil .... We here hold that the portions of the Voting
131 383 U.S. at 327. The original version of Section 2 was cast in general terms that closely
tracked the language of the Fifteenth Amendment, prohibiting any voting qualification, stan-
dard, or procedure that "denied or abridged the right of any citizen of the United States to vote
on account of race or color." Id at 338. Thus, Section 2 was rarely employed in voting rights
litigation until the 1982 amendments to the Act created a more specific cause of action. A vio-
lation of Section 2 can now be established under the amended Act if "based on the totality of
the circumstances," minority voters can prove that they "have less opportunity than other mem-
bers of the electorate to participate in the political process and to elect representatives of their
choice." 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b).
13 383 U.S. at 309. The House approved the bill by a vote of 328 to 74. The measure passed
the Senate by a margin of 79 to 18. Id.
d3-
13 383 U.S. 301 (1966). By the time the South Carolina case was argued, Archibald Cox had
left the Solicitor General's office and had returned to his teaching position at Harvard Law
School. Attorney General Katzenbach appointed Cox to appear as a Special Assistant Attorney
General to argue the case, along with Katzenbach, in the Supreme Court. GORMLE,
ARCHIBALD COX, supra note 87, at 199.
'35 383 U.S. at 335.
136 425 U.S. 130 (1976).
137 Id. at 140 (quoting H.R. Rep. No 94-196, at 57-58 (1975) (citations omitted)).
1 383 U.S. at 309-11, 325-27, 337. For a general discussion of the Voting Rights Act, see
GROFMAN & DAVIDSON, supra note 129; GROFMAN, MINORITY REPRESENrATION, supra note 26;
HUDSON, supra note 12.
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Rights Act properly before us are a valid means for carrying out the
commands of the Fifteenth Amendment."'' 9
IV. THE FOURTEENTH AND FIFTEENTH AMENDMENTS MERGE
IN VOTING CASES
If one examines the evolution of case-law leading up to modem
voting rights decisions, it is not difficult to identify where the confu-
sion began. What one discovers, in isolating those relatively obscure
cases in which the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendment vied for at-
tention after the initial burst of voting rights activity in the early
1960's, is that the Supreme Court innocently created a creature as
unattractive as the mythical gerrymander. Quite unintentionally, the
Court dumped the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments into a
single constitutional pool and then failed to fish them out and give
them independent roles or identities.
The Court tended to favor the Fourteenth Amendment, early on,
for reasons that can largely be traced to historical accident. First, the
Court had recently decided cases like Baker and Reynolds, utilizing the
Equal Protection Clause to deal with inequalities in voting. After
those decisions, states across the country scrambled to comply with
the Equal Protection Clause and to construct legislative districts of as
nearly equal population as "practicable."' 40 The Fourteenth Amend-
ment dominated their attention. Second, the Court had located the
fundamental "right to vote" in the folds of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, in the somewhat anomalous case of Harper v. Virginia State
Board of Elections,14' during a period in which the Court experimented
with linking fundamental rights to the Equal Protection Clause, in
order to avoid the bugaboo of "substantive due process" that had
been repudiated after Lochner v. New York.42 Third, before Congress
amended the Voting Rights Act in 1982, the Fourteenth and Fif-
teenth Amendments were briefly interpreted in lockstep. For several
years, the Court required proof of discriminatory "intent" under both
provisions, which made them virtually interchangeable. As a result of
the above factors, the voting rights cases churned together the Four-
9 383 U.S. at 337.
140 Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 577 (1964).
141 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
1 198 U.S. 45 (1905). In Harper, the Court in 1966 had found the "right to vote" implicit in
the Equal Protection Clause, rather than the Due Process Clause. This was during a phase in
which the Court stretched to locate fundamental rights within the Equal Protection Clause,
rather than the more logical due process language, so that it was not accused of re-inventing the
discredited substantive due process of the Lochner era. SeeJames A. Gardner, Liberty, Community
and the Constitutional Structure of Political Influence: A Reconsideration of the Right to Vote, 145 U. PA.
L. REV. 893, 972-73 (1997). This caused the Court to over-emphasize equal protection analysis,
generally, in voting rights cases. See id.
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teenth and Fifteenth Amendments, quite accidentally. Often, the
Fourteenth Amendment was emphasized out of habit.
Moreover, redistricting exercises in the 1960's and 1970's were
necessarily focused much more on complying with the one-person-
one-vote edict, under the Fourteenth Amendment, than with race is-
sues under Fifteenth Amendment and the Voting Rights Act. States
had begun the considerable task of overhauling apportionment
schemes that had fallen into gross imbalance, after decades of often
intentional neglect43 These decades were, therefore, largely devoted
to finding acceptable ranges of population deviation when it came to
carving out legislative districts.14 Sporadic cases involving race and
redistricting made their way onto the Supreme Court's docket. In-
creasingly, however, the Court's references to the Fourteenth and Fif-
teenth Amendments and the Voting Rights Act became jumbled to-
gether.
In the 1964 decision White v. Rockefeller,145 predating the Voting
Rights Act, the Court rejected a challenge to a congressional redis-
tricting scheme by blacks and Puerto Ricans in New York City, who
alleged that they had been packed into a non-white district. The
1 Pennsylvania's experience was quite typical. In March of 1962, the same month that Baker
v. Carr was handed down, a group of Pennsylvania voters sued the Secretary of the Common-
wealth, seeking to halt that year's elections until the existing apportionment statutes could be
re-vamped. Butcher v. Trimarchi, 28 Pa. D. & C.2d 537 (Dauphin County Ct. 1962); GORMLEY,
REAPPORTIONMENT, supra note 5, at 9. Although the Dauphin County Court handling the case
declined to block the scheduled elections, it retained jurisdiction while the Pennsylvania Legis-
lature attempted to hammer out new redistricting legislation, which finally occurred in 1963.
The plaintiffs then immediately challenged the plan under the Fourteenth Amendment, filing
their petition directly with the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. In Butcher v. Bloom, 203 A.2d 556
(Pa. 1964), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court struck down the reapportionment plan, unani-
mously holding that it violated the principle of one-person-one-vote, as articulated in Reynols.
It mandated that the legislature prepare a new reapportionment plan before the 1966 election.
The House districts ranged in population from 4,485 to 81,534, while the Senate districts
ranged from 129,851 to 352,629 in population. The Court found that this was far from the
.substantial equality of population" that Reynolds required. I9 at 561-67; GORMLEY,
REAPPORTIONMENT, supra note 5, at 9. When the legislature failed to meet the Court's deadline
to properly reapportion the state House and Senate, the state court produced its own redistrict-
ing map, seeking to adhere to the "one-person-one-vote" principle as well as to the general ten-
ets of sound reapportionment.
It was largely in response to this messy process, in its first post-Reynolds redistricting experi-
ence, that Pennsylvania amended its Constitution to create a reapportionment commission,
designed to take this sensitive job away from the legislature as body and bring a measure of neu-
trality to this highly-charged political process. See Butcher v. Bloom, 216 A.2d 457, 459 (Pa.
1966). That provision placed the job of redistricting in the hands of a five-person commission,
comprised of the four leaders of the House and Senate (majority and minority leaders), plus
one neutral chairman selected by that group or (if they failed to reach a consensus) selected by
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. See PA. CONST. art. II, § 17.
144 GORMLEY, REAPPORTIONMENT, supra note 5, at 13; Martin H. Belsky, Reapportionment in the
1970's-A Pennsylvania Illustration, 47 TEMP. L.Q. 22, 23 (1973).
145 376 U.S. 52 (1964).
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Court found that there was no proof of "state contrivance" or "moti-
vation" to segregate based upon race.146 Thus, the Court identified
no violation of the Equal Protection Clause or the Fifteenth Amend-
ment.147 It reached this conclusion without engaping in detailed dis-
cussion of either provision. In Whitcomb v. Chavis, the Court in 1970
considered a challenge to a multi-member electoral district in Marion
County, Indiana, that plaintiffs alleged diluted the votes of blacks and
poor persons living in the "ghetto area." The Court rested heavily on
pre-voting rights cases, including Reynolds v. Sims and its progeny, to
declare that multi-member districts were not "inherently invidious"'149
under the Equal Protection Clause, without squarely addressing the
relevance, if any, of the Fifteenth Amendment.'5
The Court in Allen v. State Board of Elections,'51 a 1969 decision di-
rectly premised upon the Voting Rights Act, seemed to breathe an
element of life into the Fifteenth Amendment. In a cluster of cases
from Mississippi and Virginia, the Court strongly reaffirmed the con-
stitutionality of the Act. The Court specifically recognized that "[t] he
Act was drafted to make the guarantees of the Fifteenth Amendment
finally a reality for all citizens."' 52 At the same time, the Court drew
upon the "one person one vote" principle of Reynolds to hold that
"[t]he right to vote can be affected by a dilution of voting power as
well as by an absolute prohibition on casting a ballot."'53 It also cited
Reynolds for the proposition that the Voting Rights Act "gives a broad
interpretation to the right to vote, recognizing that voting includes
'all action necessary to make a vote effective. '  The Court in Allen
concluded that the Act must be given "the broadest possible scope,"'5
but once again left the constitutional anchor ambiguous.'5
The references to the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments be-
came so interlaced by the 1970's that it often proved impossible to
14 Id. at 58.
147 Id. at 53-54, 56-57.
'43 403 U.S. 124 (1970).
14 Id. at 160. The Court also relied upon cases such as Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U.S. 433 (1965),
which was decided before the Voting Rights Act was enacted. See Whitcomb, 403 U.S. at 142.
150 OnlyJustice Douglas, in dissent, raised the suggestion that "[o]ur Constitution has a spe-
cial thrust when it comes to voting" due to the adoption of the Fifteenth Amendment. 403 U.S.
at 180 (Douglas,J, dissenting).
1 393 U.S. 544 (1969).
152 I at 556 (citing South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 US 301, 308, 309 (1966)).
153 Allen, 393 U.S. at 569 (emphasis added).
14 Id. at 566 (citing Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 555 (1962)).
155 Allen, 393 U.S. at 567.
1% Justice Harlan, concurring in part and dissenting in part, argued that the proper founda-
tion for the Court's analysis was the Fifteenth Amendment rather than the Fourteenth Amend-
ment equal protection cases. Ironically, Harlan argued that the Fifteenth Amendment should
lead to a narrower interpretation of the Voting Rights Act than that endorsed by the majority.
Id at 589-91 (Harlan,J., concurring and dissenting in part).
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discern which provision the Court was relying upon, if either. On top
of this, references to the Voting Rights Act were often thrown in
(presumably implicating the Fifteenth Amendment, upon which the
Act was premised). From this hodgepodge came a jurisprudential
confusion that seeped into the case-law. In the 1973 decision of White
v. Regester,1 57 the Court first upheld one portion of a redistricting plan
for the Texas House of Representatives under a simple one-person-
one-vote analysis linked to the Equal Protection Clause.t s The Court
went on, however, to invalidate multimember districts in Dallas and
Bexar Counties, which plaintiffs alleged "invidiously excluded Mexi-
can-Americans from effective participation in political life, specifically
in the election of representatives to the Texas House of Representa-
tives," employing a different analysis. 9 Using language that would
later be incorporated into the Voting Rights Act-linked to the "total-
ity of the circumstances" 1 --the Court embraced a broad "results
test" under the Voting Rights Act. It affirmed the district court's find-
ings, which threw out this portion of the Texas redistricting plan,
based on "a blend of history and an intensely local appraisal of the
design and impact of the Bexar County multi-member district in the
light of past and present reality, political and otherwise."'16' Thus, the
decision was an amalgam of Equal Protection Clause and Voting
Rights Act analysis, with no clear lines of demarcation.
Mobile v. Bolden,'62 in 1980, threw the case-law into increased tur-
moil. In Mobile, a plurality of the Court swung away from the White v.
Regester "results test" approach. Instead, it declared that an at-large
voting system did not amount to unconstitutional vote dilution under
the Fourteenth Amendment or the Fifteenth Amendment (via the
Voting Rights Act), absent proof that it had been maintained for a
discriminatory purpose.'63 Mobile thus seemed to toss Fifteenth
Amendment and Voting Rights Act claims directly into the same bin
as Fourteenth Amendment decisions, requiring the Voting Rights Act
to march in step with then-predominant Fourteenth Amendment
case-law.
157 412 U.S. 755 (1973).
158 Id. at 764.
l9 Id. at 765-69.
1W Id at 769. The "totality of the circumstances" language employed by Justice White was
later incorporated by Congress into Section 2 of the Act when it was amended in 1982.
16Id. at 769-70. The Court stated that: "The plaintiffs burden is to produce evidence to
support findings that the political processes leading to nomination and election were not
equally open to participation by the group in question-that its members had less opportunity
than did other residents in the district to participate in the political processes and to elect legis-
lators of their choice." Id. at 766 (citing Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. at 149-50).
162 446 U.S. 55 (1980).
163 Mobile, 446 U.S. at 62.
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Again, in Rogers v. Lodge, 6e the Court in mid-1982 held that dis-
criminatory intent was "a requisite to a finding of unconstitutional
vote dilution" under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments.l,
The majority of the Court found sufficient proof of discriminatory in-
tent in Rogers to establish a violation. Justice Powell, joined by Justice
Rehnquist, dissented, citing the Court's Fourteenth Amendment de-
cision in Washington v. Davis and stating firmly: "[T] he central pur-
pose of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is
the prevention of official conduct discriminating on the basis of
race."'166 Thus, at least for some members of the Court, the Voting
Rights Act and the Fifteenth Amendment dealt only with the right to
participate in elections and played no role in vote dilution cases, ab-
sent proof of discriminatory intent.
Although Gingles was decided in 1986, upholding the 1982 legisla-
tive amendments that made clear discriminatory intent was not a re-
quirement under the statute, the case-law was never quite untan-
gled. Well into the next decade, the Supreme Court continued to
treat the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments as largely inter-
changeable in the context of voting rights cases. In the 1993 decision
of Voinovich v. Quilter,6s for example, the Court addressed a voting
rights claim by a group of African-American voters in Ohio who al-
leged that they had been "packed" into districts with disproportion-
ately large numbers of minority citizens in order to dilute their votes
and prevent them from having a larger number of "influence" dis-
tricts in which they could elect their "candidates of choice."' 69 In re-
jecting plaintiffs' Voting Rights Act claim, the Court patched together
a hybrid Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendment analysis, concluding
that the plaintiffs had never proven the intentional discrimination
that they had alleged, and that the lower court had erred in finding
intentional discrimination against black voters.1' ° In sweeping the Fif-
teenth Amendment allegation under the rug, the Court went on to
state: "This Court has not decided whether the Fifteenth Amend-
ment applies to vote-dilution claims; in fact, we never have held any
I6A 458 U.S. 613 (1982).
16 Rogers, 458 U.S. at 621. In Rogers, the majority found that the district court did not err in
concluding that the at-large election scheme for the Board of Commissioners in Burke County,
Georgia, was intentionally discriminatory. Id. at 622. The Court focused on the Equal Protec-
tion Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment in its analysis.
6 Id. at 631 (Powell,J., dissenting) (quoting Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976)).
16 See Ging&s, 478 U.S. at 35.
168 507 U.S. 146 (1993).
1 X at 149-50.
11 Id. at 147-48. The Court, per Justice O'Connor, made clear that it was not reaching a
conclusion "whether influence-dilution claims such as appellees are viable under Section 2" of
the Voting Rights Act. Id. at 154.
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legislative apportionment inconsistent with the Fifteenth Amend-
ment.
, 171
In Shaw I, decided the same year as Voinovich, the Court again
minimized the significance of the Fifteenth Amendment in vote dilu-
tion cases, even though the Voting Rights Act had specifically been
enacted by Congress pursuant to its Fifteenth Amendment enforce-
ment powers, an exercise of power that had been upheld. Justice
O'Connor in Shaw Iwent so far as to suggest that the 1960 Gomillion
decision was actually based upon the Fourteenth rather than the Fif-
teenth Amendment (as the majority in Gomillion had decided), thus
nudging the Fifteenth Amendment even further into a comer in vote
dilution cases.
This unresolved tension has continued to cause problems in the
years since Shaw I and Voinovich were decided. It is true that the
Court has never directly relied upon the Fifteenth Amendment to
uphold or strike down a state apportionment plan. The closest it
came to doing so was in Gomillion, which involved the actual with-
drawing of municipal boundaries to distort minority voting rights;
Gomillion remains an anomaly. Yet the Court cannot ignore twenty
years of case-law applying the Voting Rights Act to vote dilution cases,
since Congress amended Section 2 of the Act in 1982. It is true that
"pure" Fifteenth Amendment cases are virtually non-existent in the
realm of reapportionment. However, the Court must not overlook
the fact that Congress injected the Fifteenth Amendment into the
field, in effect, by enacting the Voting Rights Act in 1965 and broad-
ening Section 2 of the Act in 1982, all pursuant to its enforcement
powers under the Fifteenth Amendment.
The Fifteenth Amendment may not create an independent cause
of action in vote dilution cases, absent proof of intent. However, that
does not make that provision irrelevant; Congress has made it quite
relevant.173
By glossing over the admittedly imprecise role that the Fifteenth
Amendment (as implemented by the Voting Rights Act) must still
play in voting rights cases, and by blurring together the Fourteenth
and Fifteenth Amendments and the Act, the Supreme Court has es-
tablished a Hobson's choice for legislatures and reapportionment
bodies. As Justice Souter properly complained in his Bush dissent,
"The States, in short, have been told to get things just right, no dilu-
171 Id. at 159 (citing Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130, 142-43 n.14 (1976)).
17 Shaw I, 509 U.S. at 645. Justice O'Connor relies upon Justice Whittaker's concurrence in
Gomillion to that effect. See 364 U.S. at 349 (Whittaker,J., concurring). The same point is made
by Justice Stevens, concurring in Mobile, 446 U.S. at 86.
173 See discussion of the significance of the Fifteenth Amendment in vote dilution cases infra
notes 264-81 and accompanying text.
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tion and no prominent consideration of race short of dilution, with-
out being told how to do it."174 In effect, those entities must create
districts that do not have the "result" of discriminating against racial
minorities, in order to steer away from violations of the Voting Rights
Act, which Congress enacted to enforce the Fifteenth Amendment.
They may not take race into account in doing so, however, or they
will contravene the Fourteenth Amendment. As Professor Karlan of
Stanford Law School has aptly noted, reapportionment bodies "now
find themselves walking a tightrope: if they draw majority-black dis-
tricts they face lawsuits under the Equal Protection Clause; if they do
not, they face both objections under Section 5 of the Voting Rights
Act and lawsuits under Section 2 .
" 173
A majority of the Court-including Justice O'Connor-has in-
creasingly come to recognize that race, at times, is a legitimate factor
in redistricting. Nevertheless, the Court has clung to the Fourteenth
Amendment as its dominant base, allowing strange inconsistencies to
creep into the "predominant factor" test.
Courts and reapportionment bodies, in the trenches, will con-
tinue to struggle with their marching orders until the Supreme Court
makes explicit that there is no such thing as a "pure" Fourteenth
Amendment or a "pure" Fifteenth Amendment claim in this unusual
terrain. The two provisions are joined at the hip when it comes to
voting rights jurisprudence. If the "predominant factor" test is to sur-
vive in the twenty-first century, the Court must directly address the
dual personality of this creature, begotten by two closely-related, but
distinct, constitutional provisions.
V. REFINING THE "PREDOMINANT FAC-OR" TEST
In the seven years since its debut in Miller, the "predominant fac-
tor" test has become increasingly complex and oblique, and hope-
174 Bush, 517 U.S. at 1063-64 (SouterJ., dissenting). For a discussion of the tension created
due to over-emphasis of equal protection jurisprudence, as it intersects with the Voting Rights
Act and the Fifteenth Amendment, see Donovan L. Wickline, Walking a Tightrope: Redrawing
CongressionalDistrict Lines AfterShaw v. Reno and Its Progeny, 25 FORDHAMURB. L.J. 641 (1998).
175 Pamela S. Karlan, Still Hazy After All These Years: Voting Rights in the Post-Shaw Era, 26
C=1B. L. REV 287, 289 (1996). The overemphasis on equal protection jurisprudence in terrain
properly occupied at least in part by the Fifteenth Amendment became so confusing that some
commentators urged the Court to re-define the Equal Protection Clause in the voting rights
context to include a "results" test. See, e.g., Grubert, supra note 77, at 1854 (concluding that "the
Court should return to requiring a showing of discriminatory effect to establish an equal pro-
tection violation"). What such logic overlooked was that it was the Voting Rights Act and the
Fifteenth Amendment that required a different judicial lens in such cases. The Fourteenth
Amendment was not the issue.
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lessly unworkable for those in the field of reapportionment. 76 This is
because the signals from the Supreme Court have been mixed. The
test has meant different things to different Justices, with an omelet of
ingredients that do not necessarily mix well when whipped to-
gether. The most conservative members of the Court, led by Justice
Thomas, have taken the inflexible stand that racial considerations in
redistricting for any reason are verboten. Thus, in Bush v. Vera, Justice
Thomas, joined by Justice Scalia, clung to this narrow position by in-
voking Fourteenth Amendment "reverse discrimination" decisions
such as Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena,""8 which had declared that
"all governmental racial classifications must be strictly scrutinized."'' 9
Justice Thomas in Bush flatly rejected Justice O'Connor's suggestion,
in the majority opinion, that some racial consciousness in redistrict-
ing might be permitted and that strict scrutiny was not automatically
triggered simply because majority-minority districts have been inten-
tionally created. Justice Thomas responded, "Strict scrutiny applies
to all governmental classifications based on race, and we have ex-
pressly held that there is no exception for race-based redistricting.
Justice Thomas went on to emphasize in Bush: "I am content to reaf-
firm our holding in Adarand that all racial classifications by govern-
ment must be strictly scrutinized and, even in the sensitive area of,, 181
state legislative redistricting, I would make no exceptions.
On the other end of the spectrum, some of the more liberal Jus-
tices-most notably Justice Stevens-have seemed unwilling to em-
176 For a criticism of that test, see Pildes, supra note 4, at 2505-06. See alsoJamin B. Raskin,
The Supreme Court's Racial Double Standard in Redistricting. Unequal Protection in Politics and the
Scholarship That Defends It, 14J.L. & POL 591, 663 (1998) (terming the Shaw line of cases "inter-
nally incoherent" and "illogical to the core").
177Justice Souter correctly noted in Bush v. Vera that:
The result of this failure to provide a practical standard for distinguishing between the
lawful and unlawful use of race has not only been inevitable confusion in statehouse and
courthouses, but a consequent shift in responsibility for setting district boundaries from
the state legislatures, which are invested with front-line authority by Article I of the Con-
stitution, to the courts, and truly to this Court, which is left to superintend the drawing
of every legislative district in the land.
517 U.S. at 1045-46 (SouterJ. dissenting).
178 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
101 Bush, 517 U.S. at 999-1000 (Thomas, J., concurring) (citing Adarand Constructors, Inc. v.
Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995)); Miller, 515 U.S. at 904-05; Shaw II, 517 U.S. at 904-05; Hunt v.
Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541, 546 (1999).
1 Bush, 517 U.S. at 1000.
181 Id at 1002-03. In Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874 (1994), Justice Thomas, concurring in the
judgment, joined by justice Scalia, went so far as to contend that the entire portfolio of Voting
Rights Act jurisprudence since Shaw was misguided and that Gingles and its progeny should be
overruled. ForJustice Thomas, any form of race-consciousness in redistricting leads to "segre-
gating the races into political homelands" that is anathema. Id. at 905 (Thomas, J., concur-
ring). He concluded: "In my view, our current practice should not continue. Not for another
Term, not until the next case, not for another day." Id. at 944 (Thomas,J, concurring).
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brace the "predominant factor" test, finding it too insensitive to mi-
nority voting rights."'82 As Justice Stevens made clear in Miller. "I do
not see how a districting plan that favors a politically weak group can
violate Equal Protection."' 3
Justice Breyer, who authored the majority opinion in the recent
Easley case, displayed a keen understanding of the mechanics of redis-
tricting. Easley is the first major decision in the past decade to uphold
a major redistricting plan, even though race was clearly a factor in
drawing the North Carolina maps. The Court concluded that politi-
cal considerations, i.e., the desire to construct districts with the
maximum number of Democratic voters, dominated the process;
therefore, strict scrutiny was not even triggered. Yet Justice Breyer's
effort to clarify the "predominant factor" test, where "racial identifi-
cation correlates highly with political affiliation"-which is true in
most redistricting cases-is so sophisticated that most judges and leg-
islators will make little sense of it. In Easley, Justice Breyer wrote:
"[T]he party attacking the legislatively drawn boundaries must show
at least that the legislature could have achieved its legitimate political
objectives in alternative ways that are comparably consistent with tra-
ditional districting principles. That party must also show that those
districting alternatives would have brought about significantly greater
racial balance. " 's4
Justice Breyer's "clarification" will only cause state reapportion-
ment bodies and lower courts to scratch their heads as they struggle
to make sense of yet another opaque standard. Still, incremental
progress is better than no progress at all. Justice O'Connor's key
opinions-as the Justice who has dominated the Court's opinion-
writing in this niche of jurisprudence-indicates that a majority of
the Court has increasingly grasped the practical nuances of redistrict-
ing. Justice O'Connor, often the spokesperson for the Court in such
cases, has walked a cautious line in rejecting extreme plans that per-
mit race to overpower traditional redistricting principles, while de-
fending those plans, such as in Easley, in which race was a conscious
yet secondary consideration. Yet those who do reapportionment
work still puzzle over several questions. What separates these two
closely-related categories of racial redistricting cases? When can race
be a legitimate factor, linked to traditional districting criteria (as in
Easey) and when does reliance upon racial factors cross over the line
into the suspect realm, triggering strict scrutiny?
A voting rights lawyer would, of course, reply that race always can
be a factor, as long as it does not constitute the "predominant factor."
16 Id. at 1038-39 (StevensJ, dissenting).
18 515 U.S. at 932 (Stevens,J, dissenting).
18 Easleyv. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234, 242 (2001).
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That simply returns us to the starting point, however, because it does
not define the range of circumstances in which a redistricting body
may exercise its discretion to consider racial factors without getting
itself in trouble.
The first step is to peel apart the respective roles that the Four-
teenth and Fifteenth Amendments must play in racial gerrymander-
ing cases. Where the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments inter-
sect, one must apply a brand of analysis quite different than that
applied in traditional equal protection claims. In such cases, it is not
sufficient for legislatures and reapportionment bodies to draw dis-
tricts of equal population that simply comply with the "one-person-
one-vote" command of the Fourteenth Amendment. Nor is it
enough to declare "there was no 'intent' to discriminate." This might
satisfy the ordinary standard that applies to "reverse discrimination"
under the Equal Protection Clause, but it is only partially helpful in
voting rights cases. The more specific commands of the Voting
Rights Act, premised upon the Fifteenth Amendment, require that
the state go one step further. The "result" or "impact" of the map on
racial minorities must also be considered. The Fifteenth Amendment
mandates that states may not "deny" or "abridge" (diminish) the right
to vote on account of race. The Voting Rights Act seeks to enforce
that command through a rather complex and cumbersome "totality
of the circumstances" analysis. This means that states must affirma-
tively pause in drawing districts and ask themselves: Are we slicing up
the districts in a way that steers wide of any potential violation of the
Act? Are the results going to be safely consistent with the Act, regard-
less of our intent?
One of the practical challenges for redistricting bodies is that a
Voting Rights Act violation is hard to identify in advance, until a
court challenge conclusively establishes its existence. States have ac-
cess to population figures, voting age population figures, and detailed
racial data, but how do they determine whether a districting map may
drift into non-compliance with the Act? They can hire voting rights
experts to crunch data, perform regression analyses, and opine
whether the Gingles test is potentially violated. The "totality of the
circumstances" test, however, leaves ample room for uncertainty and
subjectivity. Only a trial court can make such a factual finding with
any authority. The Supreme Court has indicated that determining
the "maximum" number of majority-minority seats is not the proper
benchmark for determining if the Act is satisfied. But what is per-
missible? How do redistricting bodies test their work product in ad-
vance?
18 See supra notes 183-84 and accompanying text.
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This is where a certain zone of discretion for the reapportionment
body is essential. Although strict "proportionality" is not the test un-
der the Voting Rights Act,1 a states must be able to at least examine
the rough proportion of minority citizens, compare it to the number
of proposed minority districts, and use this as a guidepost in exercis-
ing their discretion responsibly.'8 Obvious departures from the
mathematically-expected proportion of minority districts that emerge
on a given map-although these do not constitute conclusive proof
of a Voting Rights Act violation-should alert the redistricting body
and cause its antennae to go up. Taking race into account in order
to avoid such potential violations is a natural, permissible use of the
state's discretion. Thus, unlike in the domain of traditional Four-
teenth Amendmentjurisprudence, conscious consideration of poten-
tially discriminatory "results" when it comes to creating voting dis-
tricts is inevitable given the existence of the Fifteenth Amendment
and the Voting Rights Act. State reapportionment bodies cannot,
and should not, try to escape it.
The Fourteenth Amendment still plays a major role in race-
related redistricting cases. As the Supreme Court in Katzenbach ac-
knowledged, Congress's legitimate exercise of its Fifteenth Amend-
ment authority must still "consist with the letter and spirit of the con-
stitution. " 1"s Yet it is incorrect and misleading to suggest that
decisions like Adarand provide the final word for resolving voting
rights litigation. If the Court were to embrace the approach advo-
cated by Justices Thomas and Scalia in cases like Bush, this would vir-
tually emasculate the Fifteenth Amendment and return to the days
when Mobile v. Bolden8 interpreted the Fourteenth and Fifteenth
Amendments in pan materia, making discriminatory intent the
benchmark. Such an interpretation was explicitly rejected when
Congress amended the Voting Rights Act in 1982 and when the Su-
preme Court validated those amendments in Gingles. The Court must
take stock of its recent case-law and nudge the jurisprudence on track
before there is an unwitting derailment.
18 SeeJohnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1017-22 (1994).
187 In other words, states should be permitted to consider whether minority citizens are rep-
resented in roughly the same proportion as they exist in the overall population. This is similar
to the approach approved by the Court in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402
U.S. 1 (1971), in the context of racially gerrymandered school districts. In Swann, ChiefJustice
Burger concluded that the relevant proportion of minority versus non-minority students in a
district could be used as a "useful starting point" in fashioning appropriate remedial measures.
At the same time, however, the Court made clear that such proportions could not be used as
rigid quotas. Id at 23-25.
18 Id. (quoting McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 (Wheat.) U.S. 316, 421 (1819)).
189 446 U.S. 55 (1980).
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It was wise, in the past decade, for the Court to conclude that the
Voting Rights Act and hence the Fifteenth Amendment did not re-
quire states to intentionally maximize the number of majority-
minority districts (or even require strict proportionality).9 ° As Justice
Souter wrote for the majority in Johnson v. De Grandy: "One may sus-
pect vote dilution from political famine, but one is not entitled to
suspect (much less infer) dilution from mere failure to guarantee a
political feast .... Failure to maximize cannot be the measure of §
2."'191 Yet the opposite assumption, i.e., that all racial considerations
are presumptively improper, threatens to infect the jurisprudence
with an equally dangerous virus. As Professor Karlan has warned:
"Ostensibly in the name of equal protection, the current judicial ap-
proach threatens to deny the Fourteenth Amendment's intended
beneficiaries their ability to engage in the same sort of pluralist elec-
toral politics that every other bloc of voters enjoys.
'92
In the early cases, Justice O'Connor hedged her bets with respect
to the extent to which race could be permissibly considered by a re-
apportionment body. Thus, in Shaw I, Justice O'Connor wrote:
"Moreover, redistricting differs from other kinds of state decision-
making in that the legislature always is aware of race when it draws
district lines, just as it is aware of age, economic status, religious and
political persuasion, and a variety of other demographic factors." 93
In later cases, however, Justice O'Connor began clarifying her po-
sition on this important issue. In 1995, O'Connor went to the trouble
of authoring a separate concurrence in Miller specifically to empha-
size that application of the "predominant factor" test did not neces-
sarily invalidate every district in which protecting racial minorities
had been a consideration. That newly enunciated test, she wrote,
"does not throw into doubt the vast majority of the Nation's 435 con-
gressional districts, where presumably the States have drawn the
boundaries in accordance with their customary districting principles.
That is so even though race may well have been a factor considered
in the redistricting process."' 94 The following year in Bush, Justice
O'Connor went a step further, staking out a position in direct conflict
with that of Justice Thomas. Here, she made explicit that: "Strict
scrutiny does not apply merely because redistricting is performed
190 SeeJohnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1016-17 (1994); Shaw I, 517 U.S. at 913. Indeed,
the Johnson Court suggested that "rough proportionality" between the minority group's popula-
tion and the number of minority districts would generally defeat a claim under Section 2. John-
son, 512 U.S. at 1016-17.
191 Johnson, 512 U.S. at 1017.
192 Pamela S. Karlan, Our Separatism? Voting Rights As an American Nationalities Policy, 1995 U.
CHI. LEGAL F. 83, 103 (1995).
'9 Shawl 509 U.S. 630, 646 (1993).
194 Miller, 515 U. S. at 928-29 (O'Connor,J., concurring).
[Vol. 4.4
RACE-BASED REDISTRICTING
with consciousness of race. Nor does it apply to all cases of inten-
tional creation of majority-minority districts.
Thus, a majority of the Justices have gradually recognized that the
conscious consideration of race is not always impermissible or unde-
sirable in this unique redistricting context. In various opinions, the
Court has recognized that it confronts a "most delicate task" where
race and reapportionment are intermingled. 19 The Voting Rights
Act, inevitably, brings the Fifteenth Amendment "into tension with
the Fourteenth Amendment."197 The dance that the Court must per-
form here is unlike any other in equal protection jurisprudence; it
takes place on a dance-floor that straddles two different constitutional
provisions, with the Fifteenth Amendment providing equally crucial
treads for the Court's feet.
The most critical issue, in this quixotic territory where two
Amendments abut each other, is often given short shrift, or ignored
completely. The central question that courts and litigants should fo-
cus on is: Has the state adhered to traditional redistricting principles
in drawing the map? The Court has occasionally noted the relevance
of this question, but it generally gets buried in dicta. It is only when
reapportionment officials and lower court judges zero in on the sig-
nificance of traditional districting principles and recognize how those
principles set parameters for dealing with issues relating to race, that
the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments will begin to work in
smooth syncopation. A body of case-law exists on this subject; it sim-
ply has not been emphasized sufficiently in voting rights cases.
The fundamental districting principles that the Court has deemed
legitimate over the years include, but are not limited to, "compact-
ness, contiguity, and respect for political subdivisions or communities
defined by actual shared interests.. . ."19 The final principle men-
tioned is particularly important in the voting rights context. Histori-
cally, reapportionment bodies have considered "communities of in-
terest" as one legitimate factor in drawing fair and politically sensitive
19 Bush, 517 U.S. at 958 (internal citation omitted). ForJustice Thomas's contrary opinion,
see id. at 999-1002 (ThomasJ, concurring).
'96 See, e.g., Miller, 515 U.S. at 905 ("In Shaw v. Reno... we recognized that these equal pro-
tection principles govern a State's drawing of congressional districts, though, as our cautious
approach there discloses, application of these principles to electoral districting is a most deli-
cate task.").
197 Miller, 515 U.S. at 927.
19 Id. at 916. See also Shaw I, 509 U.S. at 646 (citing Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 578
(1964) for the proposition that district lines drawn for contiguity and maintenance of political
subdivisions are legitimate state purposes). For a useful detailed discussion of traditional dis-
tricting principles and criteria, see David M. Guinn et al., Redistricting in 2001 and Beyond: Navi-
gating the Narrow Channel Between the Equal Protection Clause and the Voting Rights Act, 51 BAYLOR L.
REV. 225, 262-66 (1999).
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districts.' 99 A redistricting body need not draw rigid squares of equal
population; in fact, few states do so. 2 9  Rather, redistricting bodies
traditionally take into account a host of intangible communities, seek-
ing to give them, where practicable, a voice in the government with-
out unduly fracturing that voice. Thus, school districts, religious
communities, ethnic communities, geographic communities which
share common bonds due to locations of rivers, mountains and
highways, and a host of other "communities of interest" are routinely
considered by districting bodies in order to construct fair and effec-
tive maps.29 ' Shared racial background, along with political affilia-
tion, ethnic identity, religious affiliation, occupational background,
all can converge to create bona fide communities of interest, to the
extent that the redistricting body makes an honest effort to draw lines
around geographically compact groups in order to give them a voice
in the governmental process.-=
As a practical matter, it is rare that a reapportionment body is able
(or desires) to wholly capture a "community of interest" and draw
lines around it, in a fashion that perfectly isolates it into a circle or
square. In reality, communities of interest are elusive, imprecise enti-
ties. Reapportionment bodies and lower courts must be cautious
when it comes to this concept, particularly where it serves as a basis
for creating legislative districts tied to race, because it has the poten-
tial for abuse. Specifically, it can be used as a ruse to engage in im-
proper maximization of majority-minority districts where no real
communities exist.2°' At the same time, states have historically con-
sidered a broad range of such imprecise communities of interest
(many of which are naturally intertwined) in exercising their sound
discretion. They do so to satisfy constituents. They do so to sweep
together a host of generally identifiable interest groups that wish to
be given a unified voice. This is perfectly healthy and permissible. It
199 See Miller, 515 U.S. at 916 (referring to "communities defined by actual shared interests" as
a traditional race-neutral consideration); Shawl, 509 U.S. at 646.
2W Iowa empowers a wholly neutral Commission to create new districts of equal size, some-
what randomly, using a computer program. GORMLEY, REAPPORTIONMEN4T, supra note 5, at 74.
But this is unusual and has its drawbacks, particularly in states that are more varied in their geo-
graphic terrain. Id at 74-75. For a discussion of the various methods that states employ to ac-
complish reapportionment, see Jeffrey C. Kubin, Note, The Case for Redistricting Commissions, 75
TEX. L. REV. 837 (1997).
20I GORMLEY, REAPPORTIONMENr, supra note 5, at 74.
For an excellent discussion of the notion of racial "communities of interest," see Kelly,
supra note 8. See also Miller, 515 U.S. at 920 (indicating that states may recognize communities
with a particular racial makeup, as part of redistricting, "provided its action is directed towards
some common thread of relevant interests"); J. Gerald Herbert, Redistricting in the Post-2000 Era,
8 GEO. MASON L. REV. 431, 452 (2000).
See, e.g., Miller, 515 U.S. at 919-20 (concluding that it was insufficient for the State of
Georgia to invoke "communities of interest" in constructing an unsightly, non-compact district
that had no common thread but skin color).
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is an important aspect of the state's prerogative, when it comes to
structuring its own form of government. Consequently, when it
comes to reapportionment bodies considering race in this permissive,
discretionary fashion, the courts should scrupulously avoid meddling.
In sum, states naturally digest input from a panoply of interest
groups, all of which seek to influence the political process for their
own betterment. Making race simply a factor, among many, that en-
ters the mix of redistricting is not only permissible, but inevitable and
desirable. As Justice O'Connor noted in Shaw 1 "[W]hen members
of a racial group live together in one community, a reapportionment
plan that concentrates members of the group in one district and ex-
cludes them from others may reflect wholly legitimate purposes."2' 4 It
is only when racial considerations eclipse traditional apportionment
principles that race becomes the "predominant motivating factor"
which triggers strict scrutiny. As Justice Kennedy explained in Miller
To make this showing, [that race was the predominant factor motivating
the legislature's decision to place a significant number of voters inside or
outside a particular district] a plaintiff must prove that the legislature
subordinated traditional race-neutral districting principles, including but
not limited to compactness, contiguity, and respect for political subdivi-
sions or communities defined by actual shared interests, to racial consid-
erations. 
2
The Court must therefore clarify that it is legitimate to knowingly
and intentionally draw individuals who are members of racial minor-
ity groups into districts together if done consistently with traditional
districting principles. It happens routinely. In part, it occurs in or-
der to produce a compact district, or in order to ensure contiguity.
Most commonly, as was the case in our Philadelphia exercise, mem-
bers of racial minorities are encompassed in common districts be-
cause they share legitimate "communities of interest."2 These com-
munities are not based strictly on skin color. Rather, the overlap with
common neighborhoods, churches, political affiliation, and other
shared interests that form common threads. Politics is the art of re-
sponding to cohesive interest groups, including those formed by mi-
nority citizens. The Fifteenth Amendment and Voting Rights Act
never envisioned that racial minorities would be given less input and
less influence than dozens of other groups that lobby for districts
in order to ensure themselves healthy representation. Italian-
Americans, Irish-Americans, Jews, Catholics, Arab-Americans, Latinos,
Germans, and countless other groups organize to influence the po-
litical reapportionment process. Where apportionment bodies seek
2N ShawI, 509 U.S. at 646.
Z5 Miller, 515 U.S. at 916.
M See, e.g., Kelly, supra note 8; Herbert, supra note 202, at 452.
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to respect legitimate communities of interest in drawing district lines,
without producing tortured and strained maps, they are adhering to
customs and methods as old as the American process of reappor-
tionment itself.
Indeed, "the fact that groups that have influence within the reap-
portionment process usually choose to draw districts in which they
predominate, rather than spreading themselves across a greater
number of districts, '207 should caution against the unfair assumption
that racial minority groups-unlike a host of other groups in soci-
ety-"are doing something wrong" when they seek to influence the
political redistricting process using their collective force. Redistrict-
ing bodies can and should draw lines around minority voters who live
together, and form distinct communities of interest, just as they draw
lines around countless other groups that share common interests and
legitimately seek representation together in the legislature.m As long
as the redistricting body does not apply a different set of rules to ra-
cial groups than it does to any other interest group during the reap-
portionment process, or depart from those ordinary districting prin-
ciples that have guided the construction of the overall redistricting
map, this type of conscious consideration of race is perfectly legiti-
mate and commonplace.m
If we lived in a Platonic world in which politics could be divorced
from the notion of "community,", ° it might be possible to construct
spheres of governance without reference to interest groups and other
imprecise "communities of interest." Politics, however, is a continual
driving force in the American system of government. It would hardly
seem fair, even without the Fifteenth Amendment or Voting Rights
Act, to treat racial interest groups and their "communities" more
harshly than other groups that routinely and aggressively influence
the process.211 Given the adoption of the Fifteenth Amendment and
Voting Rights Act, it would be inexcusable to do so.2
2n Karlan, Loss and Redemption, supra note 44, at 300-01.
M_ See Ken Gormley, Where To Draw the Line, N.Y. TIMESJuly 7, 1995, at A13.
See Guinn et al., supra note 198, at 261-66.
210 For Plato and Aristotle, "[b]eing a part of the political community required limiting indi-
vidual autonomy in favor of solidarity to the political whole." CHRISTOPHER M. BURKE, THE
APPEARANCE OF EQUALITY- RACIAL GERRYMANDERING, REDISTRICTING, AND THE SUPREME COURT
130 (1999).
21 A similar point is made by Professor Larry Alexander, who suggests that if the Constitu-
tion is going to invalidate district lines based upon race, "it should invalidate all outcome-driven
plans, no matter what proxies are used, whether they be race, political affiliation, or something
else." Larry Alexander, Still Lost in the Political Thicket (or Why IDon't Understand the Concept of Vote
Dilution), 50 VAND. L. REV. 327, 337 (1997). Or, to put it in different terms, the "conscientious
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Moreover, the Court should recognize, explicitly, that compliance
with the Voting Rights Act is an ongoing, incremental process, which
establishes "a baseline of fair play."2  It is unrealistic to conclude that
a state can only consider race in reapportionment after it has allowed
districts to deteriorate to a point that they conclusively violate the Act.
As discussed earlier, the state must have discretion to consider race at
some level, in order to ensure that the resulting districts do not drift
into noncompliance with the Act.214 It is the role of state legislatures,
not the courts, to exercise that judgment necessary to size up the
proposed districts and steer clear of potential violations, costly litiga-
tion, and politically explosive mistakes. It is here that the distinction
between what is "mandatory" and what is "permissive" is critical. Al-
though the Voting Rights Act may not mandate a certain level of con-
scious racial consideration,21 the Supreme Court must make clear
that such discretion is permissible. To the extent that the Court wid-
ens the zone of discretion for states in fleshing out the "predominant
factor" test, the better off courts, litigants, and reapportionment bod-
ies will be.
It may be true that compliance with the Voting Rights Act does
not constitute a "compelling state interest" for purposes of satisfying
the "predominant factor" test unless there is a "strong basis in evi-
dence" for concluding that the three Gingles pre-conditions and the
"totality of the circumstances" test can be established to prove a viola-
tion of the Act.216 Yet strict scrutiny is not even triggered where race is
simply a factor, rather than a predominant motivating factor. As long
as traditional redistricting principles are not cast to the wind in order
to group together minority voters who have little in common-as was
redistricter" must necessarily accommodate minority groups just like any other groups. See Paul
L. McKaskle, The Voting Rights Act and the "Conscientious Redistricter, "30 U.S.F. L. REV. 1, 6 (1995).
212 One argument frequently made against consciously taking race into account in redistrict-
ing, in any fashion, is that minority groups actually benefit from being dispersed widely rather
than being crammed into districts with other minorities. The assumption is that minority voters
are "better off having some influence over a broad range of legislators rather than intense influ-
ence over a few." Karlan, Loss and Redemption, supra note 44, at 300. The response to this con-
tention, as Professor Karlan has neatly stated, is that no other interest group seeks to intention-
ally disperse itself. Rather, where communities of interest exist-whether based upon racial,
ethnic, religious, socio-economic, political, or other bases-the norm is for those groups to seek
cohesion in the political process: "[T]he fact that groups that have influence within the reap-
portionment process usually choose to draw districts in which they predominate, rather than
spreading themselves across a greater number of districts, cautions against blind acceptance of
the critics' assumption." Id- at 300-01.
2 BURKE, supra note 210, at 143.
214 See discussion supra notes 183-87 and accompanying text.
215 For instance, the Act may not require that the state consider the proportion of minority
citizens in a particular geographic area before drawing districts.
216 Shaw 1, 509 U.S. at 656 (quoting Richmond v. JA. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 500 (1989)
(plurality opinion) (citing Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Ed., 476 U.S. 267, 277 (1986) (plurality
opinion))).
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true in cases like Shaw I, Miller, Shaw II, and Bush-states may remain
cognizant of the fuzzy parameters of the Voting Rights Act and the
Fifteenth Amendment, going about their business in a way that will
avoid present or future violations.
A zone of legislative discretion here is essential. Otherwise, as Jus-
tice Breyer has aptly observed, there would be no way for state legisla-
tures to adhere to the commands of the Act until it was too late: "A
legal rule that permits legislatures to take account of race only when
§ 2 [of the Act] really requires them to do so is a rule that shifts the
power to redistrict from legislatures to federal courts (for only the lat-
ter can say what § 2 really requires) .. 217
VI. A NEW PREDOMINANT FACTOR TEST
Thus far, the Supreme Court has told state redistricting bodies
what they cannot do, i.e., they cannot use race as a "predominant mo-
tivating factor" in drawing districts. That is a useful starting point.
Now the Court must spell out, with crystal clarity, the boundary lines
of that negative command: What precisely does it mean to rely upon
race as a "predominant factor" in drawing electoral districts? Second,
the Court must go a step further, stating in plain terms the positive
obverse side of that command: When, and to what extent, is it permis-
sible to consider race in the redistricting process without running
afoul of the Constitution?
A. Defining Race As a "Predominant Factor"
What does it mean to prohibit racial considerations from being a
"predominant motivating factor" in reapportionment? If it is to be
something more than tautology, that goes beyond saying "race cannot
be considered illegitimately," it must be capable of being broken
down into components that can be applied in concrete cases to guide
courts, litigants, and reapportionment mapmakers. Since Shaw v.
Hunt was decided in 1996, the Court has continued to add layers to
that test, giving it increased depth and weight. The critical compo-
nents of the "predominant factor" test can therefore be reformulated
as follows:
First, a court's ultimate goal in a voting rights case, in which racial
considerations are implicated, must be to decide whether "race was
the predominant factor motivating the legislature's decision to place
a significant number of voters within or without a particular dis-
tric ,,218
217 Abrams v.Johnson, 521 U.S. 74, 114 (1997) (BreyerJ., dissenting).
218 Miller v.Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 916 (1995).
[Vol. 4:4
RACE-BASED REDISTRICTING
Second, as a procedural matter, plaintiffs have the burden of
demonstrating this "through direct or circumstantial evidence of a
district's shape and demographics or more direct evidence going to
legislative purpose ... .,,219 The Court has stated that "the burden of
proof on the plaintiffs [who attack the district] is a 'demanding
one. )"i °
Third, in exploring whether race was indeed a predominant moti-
vating factor in the redistricting operation, a court must inquire
whether the legislature "subordinated traditional race-neutral district-
ing principles, including but not limited to compactness, contiguity,
and respect for political subdivisions or communities defined by ac-
tual shared interests, to racial considerations."221 Often, the answer to
this question will be obvious: If the legislature has jettisoned tradi-
tional redistricting principles in order to accomplish a racial gerry-
mander, the constitutional infirmity is frequently obvious because the
district is "unexplainable on grounds other than race."
222
Fourth, where a plaintiff does not meet the demanding burden of
proving that race was a predominant motivating factor in redistrict-
ing, strict scrutiny is not triggered. This is true even though race
might have been considered. In such a case the rational basis test of
the Fourteenth Amendment, which is extremely deferential to the
state reapportionment body, applies.2
Fifth, if it is shown that race was indeed the predominant motivat-
ing factor driving the creation of the district, strict scrutiny is brought
into play.224 As Justice O'Connor has stated: "To invoke strict scru-
tiny, a plaintiff must show that the State has relied on race in substan-
tial disregard of customary and traditional districting practices. "225 If
that threshold is met, the racially-driven district will be deemed viola-
tive of the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause unless
there exists a "compelling government interest" justifying the crea-
219 Id.
Z Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234, 241 (2001); Miller, 515 U.S. at 928 (O'Connor, J., con-
curring).
22 Miller, 515 U.S. at 916.
Shaw I, 509 U.S. at 644 (quoting Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S.
252, 266 (1977)); Eas/ey, 532 U.S. at 242.
See, e.g., Miller, 515 U.S. at 915-16; Easley, 532 U.S. at 242 (indicating that generally states
have wide discretion in redistricting judgments). See also Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348
U.S. 483 (1955) (setting forth traditional rationral basis standard).
M4 See Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541, 546 (1999) ("Our decisions have established that all
laws that classify citizens on the basis of race, including racially gerrymandered districting
schemes, are constitutionally suspect and mustbe strictly scrutinized.").
2Z Miller, 515 U.S. at 928 (O'ConnorJ, concurring).
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tion of the district and its creation is "narrowly tailored" to accom-
plishing that compelling interest.
6
Sixth, and finally, one way to establish a "compelling state inter-
est" sufficient to satisfy the strict scrutiny test is to demonstrate that
creation of the race-based district was "narrowly tailored" to comply
with the Voting Rights Act.22 7 This is not because the Voting Rights
Act trumps the Fourteenth Amendment (it does not), but because
the Fifteenth Amendment, which underlies the Act, creates a special
branch of jurisprudence where the two constitutional amendments
intersect.2 It is not enough for a state to prove that it had a good
faith belief that a Voting Rights Act violation might occur. Rather,
the Court has insisted that in order to establish a compelling state in-
terest in adhering to the Voting Rights Act, the state must have a
"strong basis in evidence for [concluding] that remedial action [is]
necessary. '" A "mere assertion" by the state that "remedial action is
required" is insufficient. However, if there exists a strong basis in
the evidence that a violation of the Act can be established, constitut-
ing a compelling governmental interest, remedial steps, which typi-
cally include drawing additional majority-minority districts, are le-
gitimate.31
2Id at 904 (citing Adarand, 515 U.S. at 227, Richmond v.J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 494
(1989) (plurality opinion)); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Ed., 476 U.S. 267, 274, 280 n.6 (1986)
(plurality opinion).
2V See Bush, 517 U.S. at 990 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("compliance with the results test of
§ 2 of the Voting Rights Act (VRA) is a compelling state interest"). See also Shaw H, 517 U.S. at
915, where Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote: "We assume, arguendo, for the purpose of resolving
this suit, that compliance with § 2 [of the Act] could be a compelling interest...." See also
United Jewish Org. of Williamsburg, Inc. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144, 161-62 (1997) (plurality opin-
ion of White, J.) (indicating that race may constitutionally be taken into account in order to
comply with the Act). For a useful discussion of how a plaintiff can demonstrate a "compelling
government interest" based upon compliance with the Voting Rights Act, see W. Mark Crain,
The Constitutionality of Race-Conscious Redistricting: An Empirical Analysis, 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 193
(2001).
See discussion supra notes 196-97 and accompanying text.
Shaw I, 509 U.S. at 656 (quoting Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 500 (1989)
(plurality opinion), (quoting Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Ed., 476 U.S. 267, 277 (1986) (plurality
opinion))).
2Miller, 515 U.S. at 922. Nor is it sufficient that the state accept on its face the "[Justice]
Department's determination that race-based districting is necessary to comply with the Act," in
a state required to obtain preclearance under Section 5. Id Rather, "the judiciary retains an
independent obligation in adjudicating consequent equal protection challenges to ensure that
the State's actions are narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling interest." Id.
23 This does not give a state license, however, to create any extravagant district it wishes to
create in order to comply with the Act. As a general rule, it will simply permit the state to draw
a district that is compact and adheres to traditional districting principles. If a violation of Gin-
ges is established, it will (by definition) involve a relatively compact and coherent group of mi-
nority citizens. Thus, the remedy need not, and should not, extend further than the actual
statutory and/or constitutional violation.
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Once the Supreme Court reorganizes the elements of the "pre-
dominant factor" test, as set forth above (which amounts to an eluci-
dation of previous Court pronouncements), it will have nudged the
jurisprudence forward to a new level of concreteness. Yet, even thus
clarified, that test remains a wholly negative command-it tells redis-
tricting bodies what they cannot do without running afoul of the Con-
stitution. If state apportionment bodies are to be able to take action,
without being paralyzed by the fear of stepping outside of permissible
constitutional boundaries, the Court must take an additional step and
illuminate the positive obverse of that command.
B. When Can Race Legitimately Be Considered?
It is clear from the Supreme Court cases of the past decade, par-
ticularly the most recent Easley decision, that race can legitimately be
a factor in redistricting, without violating the Constitution, in certain
instances. Yet, further guidance is needed. In what circumstances is
it permissible to rely upon racial considerations in constructing legis-
lative districts, consistent with the potentially conflicting mandates of
the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments? One way to seek to re-
solve that question is from a negative angle, i.e., by determining when
racial considerations are forbidden. If reapportionment bodies and
lower courts scrupulously apply the re-tooled, six-step "predominant
factor" test set forth above, they will generally reach the constitution-
ally indicated result. However, to the extent that application of that
test is tinged with an ill-defined assumption that the conscious con-
sideration of race is forbidden, the test will yield skewed results.
It is thus preferable for those engaged in practical redistricting
work to have available an additional, positive set of guideposts. The
purpose of these guideposts is not to displace the existing "predomi-
nant factor" approach as a hard and fast test. Rather, they are de-
signed to be considered by courts, lawyers, and redistricting officials
as an aid in defining the permissible, non-mandatory, zone of discre-
tion in this area. When assessed in conjunction with the six-part
"predominant factor" test, set forth above, these guideposts can help
yield results consistent with the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amend-
ments and the Voting Rights Act. The relevant guideposts are as fol-
lows:
First, it is essential to acknowledge the basic premise that racial
considerations in reapportionment are not necessarily illegitimate or
unconstitutional. As Justice O'Connor clearly stated in Shaw 1
[R] edistricting differs from other kinds of state decision making in that
the legislature always is aware of race when it draws district lines, just as it
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is aware of age, economic status, religious and political persuasion, and a
variety of other demographic factors. That sort of race consciousness
does not lead inevitably to impermissible race discrimination.
2
Second, it is permissible, in the exercise of its discretion, for a
state reapportionment body to consciously consider racial factors,
along with a host of other factors.m "[E]ven though race may well
have been considered in the redistricting process," this is not enough
to sustain a challenge. 2m As long as boundaries are drawn "in accor-
dance with [its] customary districting principles," a state reappor-
tionment body may properly consider race in achieving a fair redis-
tricting plan.
Third, the most common way in which a redistricting body can
consider race as a legitimate factor is in seeking to preserve bona fide
"communities defined by actual shared interest," a traditional goal of
reapportionment. m Racial communities, not unlike numerous other
communities that seek a voice in the political process, are entitled to
lobby the reapportionment body to draw lines in a fashion that allows
them to maintain political cohesion and enjoy a fair opportunity to
elect candidates of choice. Consequently, a state may take into ac-
count communities with a particular racial makeup, as part of redis-
tricting, "provided its action is directed towards some common
thread of relevant interests."237 Skin color alone is not a community
of interest. But race, to the extent that it naturally intertwines itself
with neighborhoods, municipalities, churches, civic organizations,
school districts, and other relatively cohesive and compact communi-
ties, is a perfectly legitimate factor for legislative reapportionment
bodies to consider as part of their broad discretion in structuring
their own systems of government. This common thread must be
"tangible;" "mere recitation of purported communities of interest" is
insufficient. If the common thread is limited to race, this is cause
for skepticism. More typically, it is intertwined with a host of other
identifiable communities that go into the vast political crucible.
Strict scrutiny is not triggered if race is legitimately considered in this
2 Shaw I, 509 U.S. at 646.
2M To put it another way, those seeking to invalidate a plan must do more than just show that
race was "a motivation for the drawing of a majority minority district." Bush, 517 U.S. at 959;
Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234, 241 (2001).
2% Miller, 515 U.S. at 928-29 (O'Connor, J., concurring); gee also Shaw I, 509 U.S. at 646.
Miller, 515 U.S. at 928 (O'ConnorJ. concurring).
23 Id at 916. See also Shaw I, 509 U.S. at 646; Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 578-79 (1964).
Z7 Miller, 515 U.S. at 920; Herbert, supra note 202, at 452.
M Miller, 515 U.S. at 919; Herbert, supra note 202, at 452. Thus, in Bush, the Court rejected
the communities of interest argument because evidence of commonality had not been "avail-
able to the [Texas] Legislature in any organized fashion before [the districting plan] was cre-
ated." 517 U.S. at 966.
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fashion.2 Districting lines are routinely drawn around natural pock-
ets of racial, ethnic, religious, and other groups as part of the give-
and-take of politics.24 As one author wrote: "Multitudes of social
communities characterize a healthy political community."24 This is
perfectly acceptable, so long as traditional districting principles are
respected in the process.
Fourth, in light of the unique commands of the Fifteenth
Amendment and the Voting Rights Act, there is an additional reason
that states may consider race; namely, to ensure that the reappor-
tionment map does not drift into noncompliance with the Act. In
other words, a redistricting body legitimately can keep one eye on the
"results" test. It may use "proportionality" as a guidepost, but not as a
rigid proxy for quotas. 42 This is a delicate maneuver, but not an im-
possible one. The redistricting body is permitted to use its discretion
to remain cognizant of race in a secondary fashion, to ensure that the
"resulting" districts, based upon a "totality of the circumstances," do
not unfairly disfavor racial minorities. This is justified by the specific
constitutional and statutory mandate that states shall not "deny" or
"abridge" the right to vote on account of race, even unintentionally.
The Fifteenth Amendment and Voting Rights Act are premised upon
the harsh fact that "some racial minorities have lost more than their
share for far too long."243 The law therefore provides a mechanism by
which government entities can (and should) remain on the alert, of-
fering "a modicum of fairness or impartiality without which the mar-
ginalized or oppressed may suffer further." Such an indirect con-
sideration of race in order to "check" proposed maps and allow the
reapportionment body to satisfy itself that it has steered away from
obvious danger with respect to potential violations of the Act does
not by itself trigger strict scrutiny. Only if the redistricting body
crosses the line and begins to affirmatively construct districts utilizing
race as a "predominant motivating factor," is the heightened standard
of strict scrutiny triggered.
Fifth, reapportionment bodies are entitled to a considerable
amount of deference in this area. As the Court reiterated in Easley,
"the underlying districting decision is one that ordinarily falls within
a legislature's sphere of competence. 245 The legislature "must have
the discretion to exercise the political judgment necessary to balance
Bush, 517 U.S. at 958.
240 For an eloquent, albeit theoretical, discussion of the importance of racial communities of
interest, see Kelly, supra note 8.
241 BURKE, supra note 210, at 145.
242 See discussion supra notes 185-87 and accompanying text.
243 BURKE, supra note 210, at 147.
244 Id. at 143.
ZZ Miller, 515 U.S. at 915; Easley, 532 U.S. at 242.
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competing interest." Consequently, the courts must "exercise ex-
traordinary caution in adjudicating claims that a State has drawn dis-
trict lines on the basis of race." 246
Considering these positive guideposts should assist those engaged
in reapportionment work, including lower courts, in producing sen-
sible results from the six-step "predominant factor" test. The guide-
posts should help identify that zone of discretion in which reappor-
tionment bodies can act safely, taking race into account consciously
without crossing the line into impermissible decision-making.
If the re-tooled "predominant factor" test had been applied in
conjunction with the relevant guideposts, set forth above, the same
results most likely would have been obtained in major redistricting
cases decided by the Supreme Court over the past decade.
The string of cases invalidating racial gerrymanders-including
Miller, Shaw II, and Bush-would have remained unchanged. In each
case, there was significant evidence that although political considera-
tions and other factors were involved, the redistricting body had
"subordinated traditional race-neutral districting principles" and
used race as the "predominant motivating factor" in constructing
those districts. Indeed, in most of the cases, the majority of the Court
found ample evidence that race had driven the process and led to ex-
travagant departures from the states' traditional districting principles.
Absent a "strong basis in the evidence" that concrete Voting Rights
Act violations existed, the reapportionment plans in those cases
would have been invalidated. Moreover, consideration of the positive
guidelines would not have changed the analysis. The states, in the
cases at issue, did more than seek to preserve legitimate communities
of interest and gUard against "results" that overtly treated racial mi-
norities unfairly. They actively manipulated boundaries, in disre-
246 Miller, 515 U.S. at 916; Easley, 532 U.S. at 242.
247 If a reapportionment body were to flip its analysis to the positive side of the predominant
factor test, in cases like Shaw I, Miller, Shaw II, and Bush, none would fall into the category in
which race was simply afactor, legitimately, in the redistricting equation. One could not point
to compact groups of minority voters-such as those in our Philadelphia experience-who
formed legitimate communities of interest and simply wished to have lines drawn around their
natural communities. Nor could one say that the redistricting body had considered race as a
simple "check" to ensure that the "result" of the districting plan was not facially unfair to mi-
norities and thus complied with the Fifteenth Amendment and the Voting Rights Act. To the
contrary, in each of those cases, the states departed from bona fide communities of interest.
See, e.g., Miller, 515 U.S. at 919 ("Nor can the State's districting legislation be rescued by mere
recitation of purported communities of interest. The evidence [in Miller] was compelling 'that
there are no tangible "communities of interest" spanning the hundreds of miles of the Eleventh
District.'"). In Miller, there was nothing but "fractured political, social, and economic interests"
swept within the district. Miller, 515 U.S. at 919. Nor were states simply avoiding the desire to
avoid facial irregularities which might disadvantage minorities. Rather, they affirmatively
stretched groups unnaturally in a way that perverted traditional districting principles, such that
the district was not compact or consistent with legitimate population patterns.
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gard of traditional districting principles, generally in an illegitimate
effort to maximize minority representation. Even recognizing the
zone of discretion that exists before racial factors can be said to "pre-
dominate," the Court would have concluded that the states went be-
yond the scope of their appropriate power under the Constitution.
While reaching the same results, the re-tooled test and accompa-
nying guidelines would allow the Court to much more easily handle
cases like Easley without having to bob and weave and feigri naivet6
when it comes to evidence of overt racial considerations. In Easey,
race clearly did play a role in the redistricting body's calculations.
The dissenting Justices-Thomas, Scalia, Kennedy, and Chief Justice
Rehnquist-were correct in pointing to evidence accepted by the dis-
trict court indicating that race was consciously considered by the
North Carolina legislature in drawing the Twelfth District.
24
Justice Breyer, writing for the majority in Easley, held that the dis-
trict court's findings were "clearly erroneous" to the extend that they
concluded that "race, not politics" drove the construction of the dis-
trict 249  That much was correct. In the process, however, Justice
Breyer was forced to downplay the evidence of racial considerations
to which the district court had given credence in order to steer wide
of the unpredictable "predominant factor" test. Indeed, the North
Carolina legislature, its lawyers, and its experts all seemed to engage
in a game of "hear no evil, see no evil," avoiding a candid acknow-
ledgement of the role of race to avoid stepping into that jurispruden-
tial Bermuda Triangle.a ° Such a foreswearing of conscious racial
awareness was not necessary, however, for the courts or the litigants
to correctly resolve the case. The facts proven at trial may have estab-
248 Specifically, a legislative redistricting leader, Senator Roy Cooper, while testifying before a
legislative committee in 1997, had stated that the plan satisfied a "need for 'racial and partisan'
balance," indicating express consciousness of the race factor. Easley, 532 U.S. at 253, 266 n.8
(Thomas, J., dissenting). There was also an e-mail from the drafter of the plans to senators in
charge of redistricting, which stated: "I have moved Greensboro Black community into the
12th, and now need to take [about] 60,000 out of the 12th. I await your direction on this." Id.
at 254. As well, Plaintiff's expert [Dr. Weber] took the position that "time and again... race
trumped party affiliation in the construction of the 12th District...." Id. at 240. For a sum-
mary of the district court's findings relating to race, as a factor in redistricting, see id. at 240-41.
Justice Thomas applied traditional Fourteenth Amendment strict scrutiny to this evidence and
concluded:
As I see it, this inquiry is sufficient to answer the constitutional question because racial
gerrymandering offends the Constitution whether the motivation is malicious or benign.
It is not a defense that the legislature merely may have drawn the district based on the
stereotype that blacks are reliable Democratic voters.
Id at 266-67 (ThomasJ, dissenting).
249 Easley, 532 U.S. at 24344.
20 For a summary of the testimony of the state's primary expert, Dr. David W. Peterson,
which scrupulously avoided acknowledging that race played a role in the legislature's redistrict-
ing decisions, see Easley, 532 U.S. at 239, 251-53.
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lished that race was overtly considered in crafting the redistricting
plan. However, this does not mean that the plan was unconstitu-
tional; there was no need to hide from it. Contrary to the view ex-
pressed by Justice Thomas, in his dissent,2" such a finding should not
have even triggered strict scrutiny.
The district court's principal error lay not in its assessment that
some racial juggling took place in the reapportionment process.
Rather, it erred in applying an overly-rigid "predominant factor" test.
It fell victim to the assumption that once overt racial considerations
were detected, the redistricting plan was presumptively infirm.
Had the district court worked its way through a re-tooled "pre-
dominant factor" test, set forth above and taken into account the
positive guideposts which allow consideration of race within certain
parameters, it would have most likely rejected the attack on the redis-
tricting plan. For, as the majority in Easley concluded, political con-
siderations, i.e., the desire to construct a safe Democratic seat, pre-
dominated over racial considerations in creating that district. Race
was certainly considered; to deny that would be disingenuous. Yet
traditional districting criteria such as concerns for compactness, pre-
serving political bases, and the desire to draw lines around legitimate
communities of interest were also considered heavily. It was these
252considerations, not race, that predominated.
Thus, there was no need for those involved to treat the race issue
like the plague. In light of the fact that North Carolina districts had
to be precleared under Section 5 of the Act, it would have amounted
to malfeasance for the state legislature to ignore racial demographics
in going about its reapportionment work. Particularly in a state like
North Carolina where, as Easley demonstrates, race and party affilia-
tion are closely aligned,25 3 remaining cognizant of racial factors is un-
avoidable in conducting redistricting work. The parties should have
felt free to admit it; the district court should have welcomed the can-
dor. Had the district court employed a less rigid version of the "pre-
dominant factor" test and considered the positive obverse of that test,
it would have simply concluded that strict scrutiny was not triggered.
Once the Supreme Court provides appropriate direction to lower
courts, much of the pressure will be removed from judges tormented
by impossible, inconsistent commands in redistricting cases. Litigants
and their lawyers will no longer have to stretch the truth. Fact-finders
251 Id at 266-67 (Thomas, J., dissenting). See also Bush, 517 U.S. at 999-1000, 1002-03 (Tho-
masJ., concurring).
252 Easley, 532 U.S. at 257 (suggesting that politics and "traditional, non-racial districting
principles" predominated).
253 Id. at 258.
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and appellate courts will no longer have to pretend racial factors are
non-existent in order to uphold fair and sensible maps as in Easey.
CONCLUSION
The Fifteenth Amendment gives Congress broad power to correct
state action which, intentionally or unintentionally, "abridges" or
"denies" the right to vote on account of race. President Lyndon B.
Johnson called the Voting Rights Act "one of the most monumental
laws in the entire history of American freedom."2 The Supreme
Court upheld this extraordinary Act, in South Carolina v. Katzenbach,
as an appropriate exercise of Congress's power to enforce the Fif-
teenth Amendment. Three years later, in Allen v. State Board of Elec-
tions, the Court declared that the Act should be given "the broadest
possible scope."2 The Court in Gingles upheld the equally expansive
1982 amendments to the Act, designed to ensure that racially dis-
criminatory results would not occur in the creation of voting districts.
Indeed, the broad "totality of the circumstances" test under the
amended Section 2(b) of the Act "springs from the demonstrated in-
genuity of state and local governments in hobbling minority voting
power. This means that state redistricting bodies will, and should,
remain cognizant of race in drawing fair legislative districts. Subtle
discrimination in redistricting continues to infect the fundamental
right to vote in the United States.27 Yet progress has been marked. It
is indisputable that "remedies for vote dilution (and hedges against
its reappearance) in the form of majority-minority districts" account
for the fact that minority representation in Congress has been on the
rise, after two centuries of dismal statistics.25
Z4 DAVIDJ. GARROW, PROTES AT SELAI MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., AND THE VOTING RIGHTS
AGrOF 1965 132 (1978); Karlan, Loss and Redemption, supra note 44, at 292.
Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544,567 (1969).
McCain v. Lybrand, 465 U.S. 236, 243-46 (1984), quoted in Johnson v. Florida, 512 U.S.
99,1018 (1994).
See Frank R Parker, The Damaging Consequences of the Rehnquist Court's Commitment to Color-
Blindness Versus RacialJustic, 45 AM. U. L. REV. 763, 770-71 (1996) (observing that after redis-
tricting in the early 1990's, "[Bllacks, who constitute 11.1% of the nation's voting age popula-
tion, made up only 4.9% of the members of Congress").
258 Minorities in Congress, 52 CONG. Q., Supplement to No. 44, at 10 (Nov. 12, 1994), quoted in
Bush, 517 U.S. at 1051 (Souter, J., dissenting) (demonstrating that the 104th Congress, after
redistricting, showed an increase of thirty-nine black members over the 1981 total). It is a
noteworthy statistic that by 1990, "twenty4four blacks and ten Hispanics sat in Congress, 417
blacks and 124 Hispanics were in state [legislatures], and six of the ten largest U.S. cities had
elected black mayors." HUDSON, supra note 12, at 231. After the redistricting efforts in the
early 1990's, "the number of majority-black and majority-Hispanic congressional districts nearly
doubled and the number of black and Hispanic representatives increased 50% and 38%, re-
spectively, between 1990 and 1993." See Terry Smith, Reinventing Black Politics: Senate Districts,
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It amounts to a weak deflation of constitutional principle to sug-
gest that the Fifteenth Amendment plays no significant role in voting
rights cases and that Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence has a
monopoly in this domain. If anything, the rules of constitutional in-
terpretation indicate the reverse. The Fifteenth Amendment was rati-
fied two years after the Fourteenth Amendment. As a general rule,
where two provisions overlap, the latter provision in time carries with
it a unique significance.29 For instance, as Professor Laurence Tribe
explains in his treatise, the enfranchisement of women accomplished
by the Nineteenth Amendment undoubtedly "altered the meaning of
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment with re-
spect to claims of gender discrimination. 260 Thus, the later-in-time
Nineteenth Amendment "shifted the ground" on which the previous
Amendment was built.261 Similarly, one can presume that the Framers
did not adopt the Fifteenth Amendment as mere surplusage. That
provision was designed to deal, like a surgeon's instrument, with a
precise form of discrimination (i.e., that dealing with voting) that had
long infected the American political system. The Fifteenth Amend-
ment was, and remains, more narrow in its aim than the Fourteenth
Amendment. Although the Court has been loathe to assign weights
to competing constitutional provisions,26 more specific provisions
certainly carry at least as much heft as less specific commands.
263
The Court has assiduously avoided defining the precise role of the
Fifteenth Amendment (if any) in vote dilution cases.264 Indeed, the
question has been left open whether the Fifteenth Amendment serves
any function in voting cases, other than to guarantee that minorities
265have a right to cast a ballot and participate in elections. Some cases
suggest that when it comes to the dilution of one group's right to vote
Minority Vote Dilution and the Preservation of the Second Reconstruction, 25 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q.
277,281 (1998).
259 See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 67-68 (3d ed. 2000).
26 Id. at 68.
261 Id.
See, e.g., Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 561 (1976) (declining to assign rela-
tive "rankings" to First and Sixth Amendment rights).
M Id. at 561, 570. See also Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425
U.S. 748, 769 (1976) (suggesting that advertising bans that might withstand challenge on due
process and equal protection grounds had to yield to the "close inspection" required by the
First Amendment). See also United States v. United States Dist. Ct., 407 U.S. 297, 320 (1972)
(suggesting that the President's power to engage in domestic security surveillance pursuant to
Article II, § 1 of the Constitution had to give way to the specific mandate of the Fourth
Amendment requiring warrants prior to searches and seizures). For a discussion of the related
doctrine of ejusdem generis in contract law, see JOHN E. MURRAY, JR., MURRAY ON CONTRACIS
484-85 (4th ed. 2001).
264 See supra notes 171-72 and accompanying text.




vis-a-vis other groups in society, the Fifteenth Amendment may be in-
applicable; the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause may
be the only relevant safeguard. The logic is not without some force.
Arguably, the placement of an individual in one district instead of
another does not deny any citizen a right to register, vote, or be rep-
resented.26 Vote dilution through gerrymandering is different than
imposing poll taxes and literary tests or physically restraining minori-
ties from entering the voting booth. The former "refers to the effects
of districting decisions not on an individual's political power viewed
in isolation, but on the political power of a group."267 In sum, the
typical sin committed by states in the context of reapportionment in-
volves watering down the right of a particular group to vote; the
transgression does not involve taking away rights entrely.6s
Yet it is time for the Court to acknowledge that vote dilution
claims do implicate the Fifteenth Amendment, directly or indirectly,
through the vehicle of the Voting Rights Act. Two decades of litiga-
tion has solidified the body ofjurisprudence in this area and created
settled expectations. It is not seriously questioned that Congress
acted within its power, pursuant to the enforcement provision of the
Fifteenth Amendment, in adopting and later broadening the reach of
the Act. It is too late in the day for the Court to forswear the Fif-
teenth Amendment entirely in reapportionment matters involving
vote dilution.
In adopting the 1982 amendments to the Act, Congress was
acutely aware of the danger that "dilution" posed to voting rights of
minorities. It therefore took steps to deal with that problem under
the Fifteenth and Fourteenth Amendments. The Senate Report
which favorably recommended passage of the crucial 1982 amend-
ments was issued after both houses of Congress considered extensive
testimony from private individuals and public officials with respect to
ongoing abuses of voting rights. New violations had blossomed after
the adoption of the 1965 Act.2w One of these, specifically, was vote
dilution. The Senate Report stated unequivocally: "The right to vote
can be affected by a dilution of voting power as well as by an absolute
prohibition against casting a ballot." The Senate Report pointed to
specific evidence which indicated that, after the 1965 Act was adopted
See ShawI, 509 U.S. 630, 681-82 (1993) (Souter, J., dissenting). Justice Souter was describ-
ing, generally, why districting cases are different than other types of "equality" issues.
%7 Id at 682.
In Shaw , the Court, per Justice O'Connor, described vote dilution in Fourteenth
Amendment equal protection terms. See i& at 640-41. See also Bush, 517 U.S. at 999-1003
(Thomas, J., concurring) (Justice Thomas indicating that he would apply a strict Fourteenth
Amendment scrutiny in all such cases).
See Senate Report, supra note 17.
2-0 Id. at 6.
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and minority voter registration increased, new surreptitious forms of
discrimination were developed to dilute the worth of minority votes:
Following the dramatic rise in registration, a broad array of dilution
schemes were employed to cancel the impact on the new black vote.
Elective posts were made appointive; election boundaries were gerry-
mandered; majority runoffs were instituted to prevent victories under a
prior plurality system; at-large elections were substituted for election by
single-member districts, or combined with other sophisticated rules to
prevent an effective minority vote. The ingenuity of such schemes seems
endless. Their common purpose and effect has been to offset the gains
made at the ballot box under the Act.2n
Congress was explicit in stating that the 1982 amendments were
not designed to "overrule a Supreme Court interpretation of the
Constitution" in Mobile v. Bolden. Rather, the legislation "provides a
statutory prohibition which the Congress finds is necessary to enforce
the substantive provisions of the 14th and 15th Amendments."M
The Senate Report is replete with references to the Fifteenth
Amendment (in conjunction with the Fourteenth Amendment), as
the foundation for these urgently-needed legislative modifications.m
Section 1 of the Act, from its inception, mirrored the language of the
Fifteenth Amendment. Section 2 was added to implement that provi-
sion in a broad fashion to deal with new tactics aimed at abridging
the right to vote, including vote dilution accomplished through racial
gerrymandering.
Thus, in adopting the 1982 amendments, Congress was concerned
that the votes of minorities would be watered down and they would
be prevented from electing "candidates of choice." This would di-
rectly or indirectly undercut the rights secured to them under the Fif-
teenth and Fourteenth Amendments. In addition, Congress was fear-
ful that vote dilution would have the further effect of discouraging
minorities from registering and casting ballots. 4 It would break the
determination of minority citizens to participate in the process, just
as surely as if poll taxes and physical intimidation were employed.
At the time Congress was amending the Voting Rights Act, in the
summer of 1982,James U. Blacksher and Larry T. Menefee published
an article in the Hastings Law Journal warning that the Fifteenth
Amendment was losing its identity in reapportionment cases, even
though Reynolds had relied in part on that Amendment in develop-
271 Id.
Id. at 16-17.
See id. at 17, 19, 27, 39, 41.
24 See id. at 6 (discussing the central importance of voter registration, in adopting and
amending the Act, and the various methods employed to discourage it among minorities).
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ing the one-person-one-vote standard.2 The authors proposed that,
"[i]f the purpose of the fifteenth amendment is not to be sacrificed
entirely to the newfound fourteenth amendment guarantee of major-
ity rule," a special standard should be developed by the Court to deal
with "racial vote dilution."2 "6 Of course, the enactment of the 1982
amendments to Section 2 of the Voting Right Act and the Court's
subsequent decision in Thornburg v. Gingles accomplished part of that
proposed goal. But twenty years later, the role or non-role of the Fif-
teenth Amendment remains a puzzle in vote dilution cases. The
Court has balked at identifying how that Amendment intersects with
the Fourteenth Amendment, and how each of the Amendments is in-
terwoven with the specific commands of the Voting Rights Act. The
case-law remains in tangles. The "predominant factor" test has re-
mained inscrutable, in part because it has failed to articulate how
states can adhere to potentially conflicting constitutional and statu-
tory provisions. Reapportionment bodies have continued to walk the
tightrope.
The Court should confront this problem head-on. The most hon-
est way to address the constitutional conundrum is as follows: several
provisions are at work in the unique realm of voting rights litigation.
On one hand, it is fair to say that vote dilution cases involve an "un-
usual form" of Fourteenth Amendment equal protection analysis, as
some commentators have suggested.2 On the other hand, one can
just as easily say that vote dilution cases require an unusual brand of
Fifteenth/Fourteenth Amendment analysis-a hybrid-because
Congress has employed its enforcement powers to implicate both
provisions.m Like the endless debate over whether certain confec-
tions are candies or breath mints, the true response is that both an-
swers are correct. Congress constructed a bridge, in the form of the
Voting Rights Act. That bridge has placed vote dilution claims in the
sphere of two equally important constitutional provisions. The Vot-
ing Rights Act makes absolutely no sense unless viewed through the
lens of both provisions. Equal protection relates to the Voting Rights
2Z James U. Blacksher & Larry T. Menefee, From Reynolds v. Sims to City of Mobile v. Bolden:
Have the White Suburbs Commandeered the Fifteenth Amendment?, 34 HASTINNs LJ. 1 (1982). The
Court in Reynolds had considered a long list of Fifteenth Amendment decisions dealing with
racial discrimination against black voters. Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 554-55. It had then concluded
that, because "the Fifteenth and Nineteenth Amendments prohibit a State from overweighting
or diluting votes on the basis of race or sex," the Fourteenth Amendment prohibited diluting
any citizen's vote based on population or geographic residence. I. at 557 (emphasis added).
See Blacksher & Menefee, supra at 55.
26 It. at 55.
27 See, e.g., Wickline, supra note 174; Karlan, supra note 175; Shaw I, 509 U.S. at 680-82
(Souter,J., dissenting).
21 See, e.g., Blacksher & Menefee, supra note 275; Mobile, 446 U.S. at 125-29 (Marshall, J., dis-
senting).
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Act, which relates to the Fifteenth Amendment, which relates to
equality in voting rights, all of which are implicated in vote dilution
cases.
In the realm of "pure" Fifteenth Amendment cases, involving Sec-
tion 1, the Court has interpreted that Reconstruction-era Amend-
ment generously. As recently as 2000, in Rice v. Cayetano,2 the Court
found that the "purpose and command" of the Fifteenth Amendment
were "explicit and comprehensive."2 ° It struck down a provision of
the Hawaiian Constitution that limited the right of certain citizens to
vote in a statewide election for trustees.28' With respect to Section 2
of the Amendment, the Court should be equally generous in its in-
terpretation. The Court should honor Congress's careful judgment,
in exercising its enforcement power under Section 2-after a pro-
longed process of trial and error-and acknowledge that it is broad
enough to address a wide range of subtle discriminatory practices, in-
cluding vote dilution. As the debates and hearings in 1982 revealed,
that device presents a particularly nettlesome problem; Congress has
done its best to devise a modern solution through Section 2 of the
Voting Rights Act, and it has been largely successful.
We have learned from a century-and-a-half's worth of history,
since the conclusion of the Civil War, that race and politics are in-
separable. We have also learned that the number and manner of
subtle ways in which the majority in power may seek to disadvantage
racial minorities, in the voting process, are as numerous and varied as
human ingenuity itself.2 Indeed, we may already have reached the
day in which state redistricting bodies intentionally and overtly con-
sider race in crafting districts, with an insincere nod of deference to
the Voting Rights Act, while scurrying around in back-rooms calculat-
ing how to have their own maps struck down as unconstitutional at a
later stage, in order to silently maintain the majority's dominance. As
the Pennsylvania experience demonstrated, the unexpected must al-
ways be expected in redistricting. Double-dealing and racial mind-
games are the norm.
The "predominant factor" test has gradually developed in a fash-
ion that smokes out most inappropriate efforts to exalt racial consid-
erations over traditional districting principles that have legitimately
guided the states since their creation. With a modest amount of re-
tooling, the "predominant factor" test has the capacity to effectively
528 U.S. 495 (2000).
M & at 511.
281 The provision in question provided that, in elections for trustees of the Office of Hawaiian
affairs, only "Hawaiians" (defined as descendants of the original inhabitants of the Hawaiian
Islands in 1778) could vote. Id. at 498-99.
See Shaw I, 509 U.S. at 670 (White, J., dissenting) (stating that "racial gerrymanders come
in various shades," and setting forth examples).
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guide those in the thick of reapportionment work. It can not only il-
luminate those instances in which race has been improperly over-
emphasized in the redistricting process, but also those situations in
which racial considerations can fall within the state's appropriate
zone of discretion in constructing sensible legislative districts. That
will mark a great victory for the twin provisions of the Fourteenth and
Fifteenth Amendments. For those two Reconstruction-era Amend-
ments were never meant to work at odds with one another. Rather,
operating in tandem, they were both designed to achieve the same
laudable goal, which remains the same today: to allow mere mortals,
entrusted with political power, to disperse it in a sound and equitable
manner, so that the most basic privilege of American society can be
enjoyed by all citizens.
